Essays on Household Debt, Macroprudential Policy and Monetary Policy in South Korea by JANG, HEE,CHANG
Durham E-Theses
Essays on Household Debt, Macroprudential Policy and
Monetary Policy in South Korea
JANG, HEE,CHANG
How to cite:
JANG, HEE,CHANG (2017) Essays on Household Debt, Macroprudential Policy and Monetary Policy in
South Korea, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12343/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
Essays on Household Debt,
Macroprudential Policy and
Monetary Policy in South Korea
Hee Chang Jang
A thesis presented for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in economics at Durham University
October 2017
Dedicated to
My wife Ha Jung and my children
Jaehoo and Hyunseo
Essays on Household Debt,
Macroprudential Policy and Monetary
Policy in South Korea
Hee Chang Jang
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
October 2017
Abstract: Household debt in South Korea is high and still rising. Household debt to
GDP ratio had risen at the similar pace with that in the US until 2007 but it has still
been rising whereas it has been falling since 2017 in the US. As a result, it is now higher
in South Korea than in the US. There was a dramatic growth in household debt in the
US preceding the recent Great Recession and high level of household debt was viewed to
amplify the severity of economic recession in the US constraining consumer spending.
In this context, high and continuously rising household debt could be a potential risk
factor for the South Korean economy. Macroprudential policy, which indicates policy
aims to reduce financial systemic risk pre-emptively, is a crucial measure to slow down
the pace of household debt growth in South Korea. However, there is no established
tool to analyse or evaluate its effects and relationship to monetary policy.
The second chapter presents the trend and distribution of household debt in South
Korea, and brief history of policy responses to continuously increasing household debt.
The third chapter shows how macroprudential policy works by using a simple
heterogeneous DSGE model with collateral constraint. The model is based on so-called
borrower-saver model. Despite of its simplicity, the model can clearly explain how
macroprudential policy affects household debt and related variables in South Korea.
In addition, dynamics of this model imply increasing amortisation rate is superior
iii
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measure to decreasing LTV ratio because it induces less volatility in economy. The
collateral constraint in this thesis is designed to distinguish household debt (stock)
and borrowing (flow). As a result, it is more realistic than the one mostly used in
literature. This collateral constraint setting contributes to the better results especially
when we analyse the phase of tightening household credit conditions. Furthermore, it
enables us to see how amortization rate affects the South Korean economy.
The fourth chapter extends the model mainly to see how credit tightening and
monetary policy work differently and how they interact. Habit formation in non-
durable good consumption, price rigidity in non-durable good producers, fixed cost
in intermediate good production and monetary policy are added in the model. Not
only the newly added elements themselves but also inflation make model’s responses
different from those in the previous chapter. Nominal and real rigidities make dynamics
last longer and more realistic. Due to the structure of collateral constraint, a rise
in inflation can reduce the level of real household debt whereas there is no inflation
effect on real household debt with the common type of collateral constraint. This
also influences responses to monetary policy shock. The results demonstrate credit
tightening is better than monetary policy in slowing down the growth rate of household
debt. Among all policy measures considered, decreasing amortization rate is the most
effective and increasing LTV ratio is the second. These implies that ongoing policy
efforts to slow down the growth rate of household debt in South Korea is on the right
track.
The fifth chapter shows welfare effects of macroprudential policy. The results
illustrate it is impossible to get social welfare gains in a situation given in South Korea
when discretionary macroprudential policy comes into effect. If government adopts
countercyclical macroprudential rule, it is possible to improve social welfare but it
requires welfare loss either of borrower or saver.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Household debt in South Korea is high and still rising. Household debt to GDP ratio
had risen at the similar pace with that in the US until 2007 but it has still been
rising whereas it has been falling since 2007 in the US. As a result, it is now higher
in South Korea than in the US. There was a dramatic growth in household debt in
the US preceding the recent Great Recession. The high level of household debt was
viewed to amplify the severity of economic recession in the US constraining consumer
spending. In this context, high and continuously rising household debt is considered as
a potential factor to threaten the stability of South Korean economy. Macroprudential
policy, which indicates policy aims to reduce financial systemic risk pre-emptively, is
a crucial measure to slow down the pace of household debt increase in South Korea.
So, South Korean government is trying to slow down the growth rate of household
debt by using macroprudential policy as we see in chapter 2, in spite of the lack of
proper tools to estimate overall effects of its policies. This is because household debt
is not usually incorporated into the macroeconomic models for either policymaking
or academic analysis.1 So we need new macroeconomic models which clearly consider
household debt to cope with the ongoing economic developments in South Korea.
1Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) point out that mainstream macroeconomic models usually do
not have debt in them although debt is popular issue in economic discussion.
1
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It is not surprising that the mainstream macroeconomic theories and models can-
not explain clearly the relationship between the recent economic developments and
household debt or suggests how to conduct macroprudential or monetary policy con-
sidering household debt because household debt is not included in them.2 Because
those theories and models depend on the Modigliani and Miller (1958) framework in
which real sectors are not affected by financial sectors and, furthermore, debt is always
net zero from a macroeconomic perspective: the liabilities of all borrowers always ex-
actly match the assets of all lenders (Cecchetti et al., 2011). Therefore, representative
household models cannot or do not have to consider household debt. However, there
were some economists who clearly recognized the role of debt from a macroeconomic
perspective. The first one who documented it is Fisher (1933) who had developed
debt-deflation theory of depression. The concept of Fisher’s debt-deflation is that the
depression can be caused by a vicious circle of deflation which means that deflation
increases the real burden of debt and then causes further deflation. Mishkin (1978)
argues that the balance-sheet approach, which is based on the Fisher’s debt-deflation
theory, can provide an explanation for the reason why the aggregate demand dropped
so severely in 1930 and it can explain the contraction of 1929-1933 and the severity
of the 1937-1938 recession. Minsky and Kaufman (2008) shows a recurring cycle of
instability, in which high leverage caused by complacency about debt during the calm
periods for the economy leads to crisis. King (1994) presented his view on household
debt in his 1994 European Financial Association Presidential Address based on Fisher’s
debt-deflation theory. He suggests that the real business cycle model is required to in-
corporate household debt into it.
The recent economic developments following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008 has led a wide range of analytical research investigating the role of household
debt in business cycle fluctuation.3 Moreover, the theoretical literature, developed by
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), Hall (2011), Midrigan and Philippon (2011), Eggerts-
son and Krugman (2012), Justiniano et al. (2015), and Korinek and Simsek (2016)
2Even the most recent and sophisticated DSGE models based on Smets and Wouters (2007) and
Christiano et al. (2005) do not include a financial system. Moreover, according to Kocherlakota et
al. (2009), "Macro models with financial market frictions, such as borrowing constraints or limited
insurance, were not used widely for macro policy analysis before the recent financial crisis."
3For example, Glick, Lansing, et al. (2009), Isaksen et al. (2014), and Chmelar et al. (2012).
1.1. Introduction 3
among others, not only looks at possible logical relationships between household debt
and recession, but also develop macroeconomic models which incorporate household
debt or borrowing into. It needs to be mentioned that in this literature the level of
household debt (or borrowing) plays roles to determine the length of recession and
strength of the following economic recovery. In other words, the focus of research is
rather limited on the periods of a recession and the following recovery. There is also
empirical literature which investigates household debt and its macroeconomic effects.
Cecchetti et al. (2011) find that when household debt goes beyond 85% of GDP, it be-
comes a drag on growth while for corporate debt they report a threshold around 90%
of GDP. Mian and Sufi (2012) show a disproportionately larger decline in consumption
and employment in counties that had higher household debt-to-income ratio by 2006
in the US. Martin and Philippon (2014) demonstrate consistent results with Mian and
Sufi (2012) analysing euro area countries. Jordà et al. (2011) suggest that a credit
build-up in the boom generally may heighten the vulnerability of economies based on a
study of over 200 recession episodes in 14 advanced countries. Baker (2014) show that
the drop in consumption during the 2007-2009 recession in the US was approximately
20% greater than what would have been seen with the household balance sheet position
in 1983.
The main feature of models, which differentiates this thesis from other existing
literature, is that debt (stock) and borrowing (flow) can be clearly distinguished in im-
patient household’s collateral constraint. Especially when the value of collateral goes
down, which means a reduction in loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and/or house prices, bor-
rowers do not need to renew all the existing debt contracts under the less favourable
conditions because lenders cannot force borrowers to repay the outstanding debt. Un-
der this collateral constraint, household borrowing in each period is just a small portion
of household debt. This clear distinction between household debt and borrowing is the
key ingredient of this thesis. Household debt is usually assumed to be entirely renewed
every period. But, in reality, borrowers do not need to renew all the outstanding debt
especially under the less favourable situation. For South Korea, this clear distinction
between household debt and borrowing has never been adopted before and can provide
more realistic policy analysis when policymakers try to tighten credit conditions such
as lowering LTV ratio or increase amortisation rate to slow down the pace of rise in
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record-high household debt. Recently in South Korea credit tightening policies are
introduced and expected to be introduced further in the near future.
This thesis aims to contribute to the macroeconomic policy analysis by focus-
ing on how the macroeconomic variables in South Korea are influenced by household
leveraging and deleveraging with the collateral constraints which can tell the difference
between debt and borrowing. In the following chapters, I construct Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models with household debt for South Korea to provide
tools to analyse policy effects of macroprudential and monetary policies. This study
is expected to provide useful tools for the policy makers in South Korea but these
tools can be utilised by the policy makers of other countries with similar economic
developments.
Highlighting this research gap, the following research questions are addressed in
this thesis:
1. How would macroprudential policy affect the South Korean economy?
2. How would the effects of macroprudential policy be different from those of mon-
etary policy in South Korea?
3. Is macroprudential policy more effective than monetary policy in slowing down
the pace of increasing in household debt in South Korea?
4. What are the welfare implications of macroprudential policy in South Korea?
1.2 Contribution of this thesis
I develop Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models which incorporate
into household debt with more realistic borrowing constraints for the South Korean
economy (Methodological Contribution). Then, I suggest some policy implications
for South Korean policy makers to deal with high level of household debt considering
overall macroeconomic effects and further provide household welfare implications of
macroprudential policies (Policy Contribution).
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1.3 Organisation of this thesis
Chapter 2 shows the recent trend and distribution of household debt and related pol-
icy responses in South Korea. Chapter 3 presents a model to analyse the effects of
macroprudential policy in South Korea. This model is based on a simple standard
Real Business Cycle (RBC) model which focuses on the real variables. It does not
consider either nominal variables or monetary policy to see the effects of macropruden-
tial policy with minimum scale. Before elaborating model specifications, key existing
literature, which provides basic structure of models in this thesis, is discussed in detail.
In calibration, we show how this model fits the South Korean economy considering
household debt. And results from stochastic simulations are presented to show how
the South Korean economy reacts dynamically to the exogenous shocks. Results show
reasonable dynamics of variables considering the degree of simplicity of a RBC model
leaving more detailed outcomes from the following DSGE model. In chapter 4, we
adds the monetary side to the basic model presented in the previous chapter and in-
troduces a nominal rigidity in firm’s pricing. In other words, a medium-scale New
Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for South Korea,
which incorporates nominal household debt, is presented to analyse a more compre-
hensive effects of macroprudential policy and monetary policy on macroeconomy in
South Korea. Chapter 5 shows welfare effects of discretionary macroprudential policy
using the model introduced in the previous chapter and analyses further to find optimal
countercyclical macroprudential policy rule. Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of
all results, limitations of this thesis, and future directions for research.
Chapter 2
Household Indebtedness in South
Korea
2.1 Introduction
Household debt in South Korea is high and still rising. In this chapter, the trend and
distribution (by income and age) of household debt in South Korea are illustrated and
then the brief history of policy responses related to household debt is described.
2.2 Trend and distribution
2.2.1 Trend
In South Korea, financial liberalisation and deregulation started in the early 1990s but
mortgage was not liberalised before the 1997 Foreign Currency Crisis. As shown in
Figure 2.1, household debt started to increase significantly since early 2000s following
the substantial liberalisation of mortgage late 1990s. After recording 20-30% growth
in household debt during the period of 2001-2002, the South Korean government re-
acted to the rapid credit growth by tightening financial regulation and supervision in
2003. Household debt increased until the end of 2003 when so-called credit card crisis
happened and it shrank until 2004. However, it rebounded rapidly since 2005 and has
6
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not been affected significantly by the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. As a result,
household debt has been rising at a steady pace without any significant adjustment
since 2005 and, as of the end of 2016, household debt level in South Korea was over
90% of GDP and over 170% of net disposable income.
Figure 2.1: Trend of household debt in South Korea
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Household debt to GDP
Household debt to net disposable income
(%)
Sources: BIS, Bank of Korea
In Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, household debt to GDP ratios in selected advanced
economies are compared. Figure 2.2 shows countries in which household debt is increas-
ing like in South Korea. All these countries including South Korea have experienced
very similar increasing trends in household debt to GDP ratios. Figure 2.3 describes
countries in which household debt is decreasing after reaching its peak between 2007-
2009. Household debt reached its peak in 2007 in the US and in 2009 in the rest of
countries.
2.2.2 Distribution
Table 2.1 shows household debt share by income quantile as of the end of March 2015.
High income (4th and 5th quantile) households have about 70% of the total household
debt and about 75% of the total household income. Low income (1st and 2nd quantile)
households have only around 15% of household debt, which is quite higher than their
income share (around 10%). Table 2.2 shows household debt share by age group as
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Figure 2.2: Increasing household debt in selected countries (% of GDP)
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Figure 2.3: Decreasing household debt in selected countries (% of GDP)
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of the end of March 2015. Only the oldest age group (older than 60) households have
higher share in household debt than in income. More than 80% of household debt is
held by three older age groups (40-49, 50-59 and 60-).
Table 2.1: Household debt by income quintile (2015)
1st (lowest) 2nd 3rd 4th 5th (highest)
Household income share 1.8 8.0 15.5 25.1 49.7
Household debt share 4.1 11.0 15.2 23.7 46.0
Source: Survey of Household Finances, Statistics Korea
Table 2.2: Household debt by age group (2015)
∼ 29 30 ∼ 39 40 ∼ 49 50 ∼ 59 60 ∼
Household income share 1.0 16.4 32.2 32.9 17.4
Household debt share 0.5 14.1 30.1 32.0 23.2
Source: Survey of Household Finances, Statistics Korea
2.3 Policy responses
In South Korea, policy responses related to increasing household debt have been actu-
ally more closely related to increasing house prices. As Figure 2.4 shows, house price in
South Korea has kept rising since 2000. Policies have been mainly focused on housing
demand rather than housing supply. Housing demand can be affected by the availabil-
ity of mortgage loan. Thus, policy responses to increasing household debt and house
prices were conducted mainly by changing LTV ratios or DTI (debt to income) ratios.1
Table 2.3 summarises the brief history of LTV regulation. It was first introduced in
late 2002. Except in 2004 and 2014, LTV ratio were lowered to tighten household
credit conditions because household debt and house prices have never decreased since
the introduction of LTV regulation in 2002. In addition, interest-only mortgage was
prohibited since 2016. Before that, there was no amortisation requirement. The share
of interest-only mortgage was 93.6% as of the end of 2010 and it dropped to 61.1% as
1See Igan and Kang (2011) for the brief history of changing DTI ratios in South Korea
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of the end of 2015. Although more recent mortgage borrowers chose to amortise their
debt, they were not forced by regulation.
Figure 2.4: House price index (1990=100)
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Table 2.3: Brief history of LTV regulation
Target (maturity, area and
collateral value)
Change in LTV ra-
tio
Sep. 2002 Introduction Speculation-prone zone 60%
Nov. 2002 Expanding
target area
All area 60%
May. 2003 Tightening Under 3 years, Speculative
and speculation-prone zone
60%→ 50%
Oct. 2003 Tightening Under 10 years, Speculative
zone
50 ∼ 60%→ 40%
Mar. 2004 Loosening Amortised over 10 years, All
area
60%→ 70%
Jul. 2005 Tightening Non-amortised over 10
years, All area, Over 600mil
won
60%→ 40%
Jul. 2009 Tightening Seoul Metropolitan Area,
Over 600mil won
60%→ 50%
Jul. 2014 Loosening All maturity, All area, All
collateral
40 ∼ 70%→ 70%
Jul. 2014 Loosening All maturity, All area, All
collateral
40 ∼ 70%→ 70%
Jun. 2017 Tightening All maturity, Seoul and
some other cities, Over
500mil won
70%→ 60%
Source: Igan and Kang (2011) (recent three measures added by author)
Chapter 3
Household Debt and
Macroprudential Policy in South
Korea: a Simple DSGE Model
3.1 Introduction
Household debt in South Korea is high and still rising. Household debt to GDP ratio
had risen at the similar pace with that in the US until 2007 but it has still been rising
whereas it has been falling since 2007 in the US. As a result, it is now higher in South
Korea than in the US as in Figure 3.1.1 There was a dramatic growth in household debt
in the US preceding the recent Great Recession. The high level of household debt was
viewed to amplify the severity of economic recession in the US constraining consumer
spending. In this context, high and continuously rising household debt is considered as
a potential factor to threaten the stability of South Korean economy. In this context,
macroprudential policy, which indicates policy aims to reduce financial systemic risk
pre-emptively, is a crucial measure to slow down the pace of household debt increase
in South Korea. So, South Korean government is trying to slow down the growth rate
of household debt by using macroprudential policy as we see in chapter 2, in spite
1Household debt to GDP ratio in Sweden shows very similar increasing pace with that in South
Korea.
12
3.1. Introduction 13
of the lack of proper tools to estimate overall effects of its policies. This is because
household debt is not usually incorporated into the macroeconomic models for either
policymaking or academic analysis.2 So I begin to construct a new macroeconomic
model which clearly shows the role of household debt in South Korean macroeconomy
and with which policymakers can simulate their policy measures.
It would be good enough to start from a simple RBC model without monetary
policy rather than a larger scale general equilibrium model so as to focus on the basic
mechanism of household debt and macroprudential policy in the economy. The results
from this model show a fairly good performance in matching steady-state ratios and
volatility in South Korea, especially regarding household debt related variables.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 highlights key liter-
ature. Section 3.3 describes the model. Section 3.4 discusses main characteristics of
equilibrium and steady-state. Calibration of parameter values is presented in section
3.5. Quantitative results are illustrated in section 3.6. Finally, conclusion is presented
in section 3.7.
Figure 3.1: Household debt to GDP ratio
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40
50
60
70
80
90
100
South Korea
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Sweden
Source: BIS
2Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) point out that mainstream macroeconomic models usually do
not have debt in them although debt is popular issue in economic discussion.
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3.2 Literature Review
It is not surprising that the mainstream macroeconomic theories and models cannot
explain clearly the relationship between the recent economic developments and house-
hold debt or suggests how to conduct macroprudential or monetary policy considering
household debt because household debt is not included in them.3 Economic theories
and models basically depend on the Modigliani and Miller (1958) framework in which
real economy is not affected by financial sectors. Furthermore, debt is always net zero
from a macroeconomic perspective: the liabilities of all borrower always exactly match
the assets of all lenders (Cecchetti et al., 2011). If a macroeconomic model does not
consider household debt, households do not need to be heterogeneous. However, to
incorporate household debt into a model, households need to be assumed heteroge-
neous as King (1994) suggested.4 There are two ways to put heterogeneous households
in a macroeconomic model in terms of the source of their heterogeneity. The first
one is to assume that heterogeneity between households comes from uninsurable id-
iosyncratic shocks5 even though they are initially homogeneous. The second one is to
assume that households have different time preferences from the beginning: patient
household is a saver and impatient one is a borrower. In this thesis, the latter is used
to model household’s heterogeneity as in Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), Iacoviello
(2005), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Justiniano et al. (2015).
As Becker (1980)6 shows, there is no steady-state with positive consumption by
all households if we set the economy with heterogeneous households in terms of differ-
ent time preference. There are two different approaches to overcome this unrealistic
result. First, setting borrowing limit for impatient household. The simplest way is to
set this limit as exogenous as in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). The more sophis-
3Even the most recent and sophisticated DSGE models based on Smets and Wouters (2007) and
Christiano et al. (2005) do not include a financial system. Moreover, according to Kocherlakota et
al. (2009), "Macro models with financial market frictions, such as borrowing constraints or limited
insurance, were not used widely for macro policy analysis before the recent financial crisis."
4Household heterogeneity in King (1994) comes from different marginal propensity to spend be-
tween debtors and creditors.
5It is called Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget model. For example, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) study
this kind of model. The details of this model can be found in Heathcote et al. (2009).
6He assumes that a household’s utility function is time-additive and stationary with a constant
rate of time preference.
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ticated way is to tie borrowing limit to the value of collateral. This kind of collateral
constraint is spawned by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)’s seminal paper. Second, making
time preference time-variant. This type of time preference is called endogenous time
preference. Shi and Epstein (1993) show that all heterogeneous households can have
positive wealth in the long run under this specification. But this approach is techni-
cally hard to deal with macroeconomic models. So many recent researchers adopt the
first approach which sets collateral constraint on impatient household. It is also used
in this thesis.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), large literature use a collateral constraint
in a macroeconomic model not only for firms but also for households. Among others,
Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2005, 2009), Iacoviello and Neri (2010),
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), and Justiniano et al. (2015) adopt this framework for
households. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) set a collateral constraint for firms and collat-
eral is the land. Iacoviello (2005) develops it as a collateral constraint for impatient
household and housing stock is used as collateral. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) use
a similar setting but there is an interesting difference between Iacoviello (2005) and
Campbell and Hercowitz (2005). Iacoviello (2005) uses the same collateral constraint
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which has only loan-to value (LTV) ratio and in
which household debt is entirely renewed every time. A collateral constraint in Camp-
bell and Hercowitz (2005) is slightly different. It explicitly incorporates amortisation
rate as well as LTV ratio and household debt is not entirely renewed every time under
debt contract. This mechanism enables us to look at the behaviour in borrowing and
accumulated debt separately. The model in this chapter is an extension of Campbell
and Hercowitz (2005) by making LTV ratio and amortisation rate time-variant.7 As
macroprudential policy to secure financial stability is a recent topic in academia as
well as in policymakers, literature which focuses specifically on it has relatively short
history. Gelain et al. (2013) find that macroprudential tools such as change in LTV
ratio is effective for dampening excess volatility in the economy. Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2014) analyse that rule based LTV ratio can improve the stability of economy.
7Justiniano et al. (2015) set a similar collateral constraint, but only LTV ratio is time-variant.
Chen and Columba (2016) illustrate time-variant amortisation requirement model but their analysis
is done only in terms of permanent changes in amortisation requirement.
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Justiniano et al. (2015) show that decrease in LTV ratio leads to decline in debt to
GDP ratio.
There is empirical literature investigates household debt and its macroeconomic
effects. Cecchetti et al. (2011) find that when household debt goes beyond 85% of GDP,
it becomes a drag on growth while they report a threshold around 90% of GDP for
corporate debt. Mian and Sufi (2012) show a disproportionately larger decline in con-
sumption and employment in counties that had higher household debt-to-income ratio
by 2006 in the US. Martin and Philippon (2014) demonstrate consistent results with
Mian and Sufi (2012) analysing euro area countries. Jordà et al. (2011) suggest that
a credit build-up in the boom generally may heighten the vulnerability of economies
based on a study of over 200 recession episodes in 14 advanced countries. Baker (2014)
show that the drop in consumption during the 2007-2009 recession in the US was ap-
proximately 20% greater than what would have been seen with the household balance
sheet position in 1983.
Many researchers have studied how household debt can affect macroeconomy fol-
lowing the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. However, a vast majority of research
focuses only on the US and European countries where the recent financial crisis hap-
pened. Comparing South Korean economy with that of the US from the perspective
of household debt and its macroeconomic influences, there must be not only similari-
ties but also differences. In South Korea, household debt has not apparently harmed
the economy yet, whereas it affected the economy negatively in the US through the
recent episodes of financial crisis and following slow recovery. In this context, many
researchers in South Korea just focus on sustainability of household debt as in Kim et
al. (2014) rather than building macroeconomic models which include household debt.
Some recent studies (Jung, 2015; Lee, 2011; Lee and Song, 2015) for the South Korean
economy have considered the role of household debt by using structural DSGE mod-
els but incorporated only constant LTV ratio as a parameter in borrower’s collateral
constraint. As for macroprudential policy, Igan and Kang (2011) find the impact of
change in LTV ratio on house price rather than overall economy.
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3.3 Model
In this chapter, I try to build a simple DSGE model based on a Kydland and Prescott
(1982)’ RBC model. A collateral constraint is incorporated as in Campbell and Her-
cowitz (2005) to understand how household borrowing and debt affect major macro
variables and vice versa. Shocks come from changes not only in productivity but also
in LTV ratio and amortisation rate. In addition, we add housing preference shock to
produce house price change which is not related to credit conditions.8 To make the
model as simple as possible, price stickiness and monetary policy are ruled out.9 So we
can see the simple and basic role of household debt in a simplified economy. The more
complex model with inflation, price rigidity and monetary policy will be introduced in
the next chapter mainly for the monetary policy analysis.
Time is discrete and its horizon is infinite in this economy. There are impatient
and patient households, non-durable good producer, house producer and government.
Households are heterogeneous in terms of different time preference. Impatient house-
hold has higher discount rate (lower discount factor) than patient household, so that
impatient household borrows from patient household against collateral (houses). Im-
patient household’s borrowing is limited to the certain ratio of collateral value. Both
type of household consumes non-durable goods, own houses, and provide labours. Pa-
tient household owns the entire capital stock because impatient household never owns
capital with perpetually binding borrowing constraint. Non-durable good producer
produces non-durable goods, hiring labour from both households and combining them
with capital according to a constant return to scale (CRS) production function. House
producer purchases a certain amount of non-durable goods to transform them into
houses, which it sells to households. Government balances its budget. There are four
key assumptions. First, households are heterogeneous in terms of different time pref-
erence, which induces lending and borrowing among them. Second, households own
houses which serve as collateral for impatient household to finance. Third, there are
two kinds of producers in the supply side: one is a good producer and the other is a
8We follow this setting as in Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Justiniano et al.
(2015).
9Without fiscal policy, housing stock and housing investment cannot help but being estimated
higher than the actual data. Thus, fiscal policy is included in this model.
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house producer. Fourth, there is no central bank, that is, no monetary policy.
Impatient Household
Impatient and patient households are denoted by b (borrower) and s (saver), respec-
tively. Impatient household shares ψ of the population (0 <ψ <1). Utility function for
impatient household is as follows.10
Ub,t = lnCb,t + φt lnHb,t −
L1+ηb,t
1 + η (3.3.1)
where Cb,t is consumption of non-durable goods, Hb,t is stock of houses (durable goods),
Lb,t is hours worked, η is inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply and φt is preference
for housing services. The price of non-durable goods is assumed to be one. Fluctuations
in φt can be interpreted as random changes in marginal utility of housing stock. A cycle
in house prices can be mimicked by changing φt. φt is exogenous and its log follows
AR(1) process and φ is the steady-state value of φt.
lnφt = ρφ lnφt−1 + (1− ρφ) lnφ+ εφ,t (3.3.2)
where 0 < ρφ < 1 and εφ,t is an i.i.d. zero mean normal random disturbance with
constant variance σφ2.
Impatient household maximises its lifetime expected utility at time 0.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtbUb,t
where βb is impatient household’s discount factor and βb <βs.
Budget constraint is
Cb,t +Ph,tNb,t + (Rt−1− 1 + %t−1)Db,t ≤ Wb,tLb,t +Db,t+1− (1− %t−1)Db,t−Tb,t (3.3.3)
where Nb,t = Hb,t+1 − (1 − δh)Hb,t, Nb,t is residential investment (new houses), Ph,t
10We assume separability in household utility function of durables (houses) and non-durables as in
Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), and many other previous work. Bernanke (1985)
shows that separability in household utility of durables and non-durables is not rejected empirically,
so that separability in household utility function across goods does not harm the plausibility of results
from it.
3.3. Model 19
is house price, Wb,t is the (real) wage, Tb,t is lump-sum tax and transfer from the
government and Db,t is the amount of (real) debt at the end of time t-1 and at the
beginning of time t. The interest paid for existing debt at time t is (Rt−1 − 1)Db,t
where Rt−1 is gross (real) interest rate. Borrowing is different from debt in our model
because debt is not fully paid back each period.11 A ratio of debt paid back at time t
is amortisation rate, %t−1. New borrowing at time t is Db,t+1 − (1− %t−1)Db,t.
Impatient household can only borrow up to a certain fraction of newly purchased
houses which serve as collateral at time t, as in Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) and
Chen and Columba (2016). Its collateral constraint is as follows.
Db,t+1 − (1− %t−1)Db,t ≤ θtPh,tNb,t12 (3.3.4)
where %t−1 is the stochastic amortisation rate. %t−1 can be different from depreciation
rate, δh. %t is exogenous and its log follows AR(1) process and % is the steady-state
value of %t.
ln %t = ρ% ln %t−1 + (1− ρ%) ln %+ ε%,t (3.3.5)
where 0 < ρ% < 1 and ε%,t is an i.i.d. zero mean normal random disturbance with
constant variance σ%2.
Similarly, θt is the stochastic loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and θ is the steady-state
value of θt.
ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + (1− ρθ) ln θ + εθ,t (3.3.6)
where 0 < ρθ < 1 and εθ,t is an i.i.d. zero mean normal random disturbance with
constant variance σθ2.
Lagrangian for impatient household can be defined as follows.
L =E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
[
lnCb,t + φt lnHb,t −
L1+ηb,t
1 + η + λb,t[Wb,tLb,t +Db,t+1 − Tb,t − Cb,t
− Ph,t{Hb,t+1 − (1− δh)Hb,t} −Rt−1Db,t] + λb,tµb,t
[
(1− %t)Db,t
11In most of literature (Iacoviello, 2005; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), debt is assumed to be fully
paid back at the beginning of each period and get a new borrowing at the end of period. So borrowing
is always equal to debt.
12Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) describes borrower’s collateral constraint as Db,t =
∑∞
j=0(1 −
%)jθPh,t−jNb,t−j . This is almost same with Equation 3.3.4, if written recursively. It is different from
Equation 3.3.4 in that % and θ is set to be constant.
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+ θtPh,t{Hb,t+1 − (1− δh)Hb,t} −Db,t+1}
]]
(3.3.7)
where λb,t is the current-value Lagrangian multiplier on budget constraint and λb,tµb,t
is the current-value Lagrangian multiplier on borrowing constraint. λb,t is the shadow
value of impatient household’s budget constraint and measures the marginal value in
units of non-durable good of relaxing the budget constraint and µb,t measures the
marginal value in units of non-durable good of relaxing the borrowing constraint
(Campbell and Hercowitz, 2005). This function is maximised with respect to Cb,t,
Hb,t+1, Lb,t, and Db,t+1 .
Patient Household
Patient household also maximises its lifetime expected utility at time 0.
E0
∞∑
j=0
βts
[
lnCs,t + φt lnHs,t − L
1+η
s,t
1 + η
]
(3.3.8)
Budget constraint is
Cs,t + Ph,tNs,t + Is,t +Rt−1Ds,t ≤ Ws,tLs,t +Rk,tKs,t +Ds,t+1 − Ts,t (3.3.9)
where Ns,t = Hs,t+1 − (1 − δh)Hs,t, Is,t = It(1−ψ) , and Ks,t = Kt(1−ψ) . Is,t is patient
household’s investment in production capital, Ks,t is the stock of capital owned by
patient household, Rk,t is capital rental rate and Ts,t is lump-sum tax and transfer
from the government.
The stock of capital is determined by the following equation.
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + Ft (3.3.10)
where δk is the physical depreciation rates of capital stock and the function Ft(It, It−1)
summarizes the technology that transforms It and It−1 into installed capital for use at
time t, as in Christiano et al. (2005). Ft(It, It−1) is given by
Ft(It, It−1) =
[
1− Sk( It
It−1
)
]
It (3.3.11)
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where Sk( ItIt−1 )(= ζk
1
2(
It
It−1
− 1)2) is investment adjustment cost.13 In steady-state,
Sk = Sk ′ = 0 and Sk ′′ = ζk > 0.
Lagrangian for patient household can be defined as follows.
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
[
lnCs,t + φt lnHs,t − L
1+η
s,t
1 + η + λs,t
[
Ws,tLs,t +
Rk,tKt
1− ψ +Ds,t+1 − Ts,t
− Cs,t − Ph,t{Hs,t+1 − (1− δh)Hs,t} − It1− ψ −Rt−1Ds,t
]
+ λs,tµs,t1− ψ
[{
1− ζk 12
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2}
It −Kt+1 + (1− δk)Kt
]]
(3.3.12)
where λs,t is the current-value Lagrangian multiplier on budget constraint. This func-
tion is maximised with respect to Cs,t, Hs,t+1, Ls,t, Kt+1, Ds,t+1 and It.
Non-durable Good Producer
The production function of non-durable good producer is described by a Cobb-Douglas
function with constant return to scale (CRS) by combining labours of both types of
households and capital. The imperfect elasticity of substitution between the labour
supplied by savers and by borrowers is assumed as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).14
Yt = A1−αt Kαt
[
{ψLb,t}ν{(1− ψ)Ls,t}1−ν
]1−α
, 0 < α < 1 and 0 < ν < 1 (3.3.13)
where At is exogenous labour-augmenting (or, equivalently, Harrod-neutral) techno-
logical progress. The level of technology is non-stationary and it follows a stationary
AR(1) process in the log. We abstract from growth.
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + εa,t, εa,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σa2) (3.3.14)
Non-durable good producer maximises profits subject to the production function above.
max
Lb,t,Ls,t,Kt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t
[
A1−αt K
α
t
[
{ψLb,t}ν{(1− ψ)Ls,t}1−ν
]1−α −Wb,tψLb,t
13Without investment adjustment cost, capital stock will increase sharply in response to a technology
shock, which is counterfactual. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) assumes fixed capital as an extreme
case of investment adjustment cost.
14As Iacoviello and Neri (2010) point out, this assumption is for analytical simplicity because
perfect substitution in production function makes a complex interplay between borrowing constraints
and labour supply decisions.
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−Ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t −Rk,tKt
]
(3.3.15)
House Producer
The production functions of house producer are as in Justiniano et al. (2015).
Nt =
{
1− Sh,t
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
)}
Ih,t (3.3.16)
They purchase an amount of Ih,t of final (non-durable) goods. Sh,t(x) = ζh
1
2(x−
1)2. In steady-state, Sh = S ′h = 0 and S ′′h = ζh > 0. As ζh increases, the supply of
houses becomes less elastic.
House producer maximises profits subject to the production function above.
max
Ih,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t
[
Ph,t
{
1− ζh12
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)2}
Ih,t − Ih,t
]
(3.3.17)
where λs,t is the marginal utility of income of saver, that is to say, the current-value
Lagrangian multiplier on budget constraint of patient household.
Fiscal Policy
The government spending follows AR(1) process in its log:
lnGt = ρG lnGt−1 + (1− ρG) lnG+ εG,t (3.3.18)
where 0 < ρG < 1 and εG,t is an i.i.d. zero mean normal random disturbance with
constant variance σG2.
The government raises revenue via lump sum taxes and balances its budget:
Gt = gYt = ψTb,t + (1− ψ)Ts,t (3.3.19)
Thus, patient household can only lend to impatient household, and the net supply
of borrowing is zero.
The share of taxes borrower pays is set to be γ. This indicates the degree of
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government redistribution. As γ decreases, government redistributes more to borrower.
ψTb,t = γGt = γgYt (3.3.20)
Market Clearing Conditions
Labour, house and debt markets are cleared as follows.
Lt = (1− ψ)Ls,t + ψLb,t (3.3.21)
Nt = (1− ψ)Ns,t + ψNb,t (3.3.22)
ψDb,t+1 + (1− ψ)Ds,t+1 = 0 (3.3.23)
The government balances its budget.
To get goods market clearing condition, we need to aggregate budget constraints
of both type of household as follows.
(1− ψ)Cs,t + ψCb,t + Ph,t[(1− ψ)Ns,t + ψNb,t] + It +Rt−1[(1− ψ)Ds,t + ψDb,t]
= Wb,tψLb,t +Ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t +Rk,tKt + (1− ψ)Ds,t+1 + ψDb,t+1 − [(1− ψ)Ts,t + ψTb,t]
Yt = Wb,tψLb,t +Ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t +Rk,tKt and Ph,tNt = Ih,t because the profits of non-
durable good producer and house producer are assumed to be zero. Therefore, goods
market clearing condition is
Yt = Ct + Ih,t + It +Gt (3.3.24)
where Ct = (1− ψ)Cs,t + ψCb,t and It = (1− ψ)Is,t.
3.4 Equilibrium and Steady State
3.4.1 Equilibrium
As mentioned above, household debt has not been commonly incorporated into macroe-
conomic models. Because of this lack, our understanding of economy regarding house-
hold debt may stay in the area of conjecture without models. Even recent literature
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has an emphasis on resulting responses of economy mainly based on impulse response
function rather than provide mechanism behind in detail. This may be partly because
of the complex structure of medium-scale DSGE models which are mostly used. Al-
though we can conjecture the dynamics of economy regarding household debt without
a model, verifying it based on a model will make our understanding much more clear.
The first order conditions of borrower’s utility maximisation are as follows.
λb,t =
1
Cb,t
(3.4.1)
Ph,t(1− µb,tθt) = βbEt
[
λb,t+1
λb,t
{
φt+1
Cb,t+1
Hb,t+1
+ (1− δh)Ph,t+1(1− µb,t+1θt+1)
}]
(3.4.2)
Wb,t = Cb,tLηb,t (3.4.3)
λb,t(1− µb,t) = βbEtλb,t+1
{
Rt − (1− %t)µb,t+1
}
(3.4.4)
Equation 3.4.1 shows the marginal value of additional current resources of borrower.
As Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) explains, the borrower does not have a standard
linear inter-temporal budget constraint due to the borrowing constraint. Therefore, λb,t
cannot be interpreted as the value of relaxing the inter-temporal budget constraint. In
Equation 3.4.2, Ph,t(1− µb,tθt) can be interpreted as the effective relative house price.
The effective relative house price is less than the actual relative house price (Ph,t)
because collateral constraint relaxes when borrower purchase houses. Equation 3.4.3
describes borrower’s optimal labour supply condition. When borrower does not have
a debt at all, which means borrower does not have any housing stock, Cb,t is equal to
Wb,tLb,t and then Lb,t = 1. Therefore, borrower works more only in order to purchase
houses and get borrowing in this case. However, when borrower has any debt, which is
more realistic setting such as in steady-state, borrower’s labour supply is not constant.
Equation 3.4.4 is different from the standard consumption Euler equation because
impatient household has a borrowing constraint. This can be rewritten as
U ′(Cb,t)(1− µb,t) = βbEtU ′(Cb,t+1)
{
Rt − (1− %t)µb,t+1
}
If there is no borrowing constraint (µb,t = µb,t+1 = 0), this reduces to the standard
consumption Euler equation.
The rest of equilibrium conditions are listed in appendix 3.A as a full set.
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3.4.2 Steady State
In steady-state, we can see borrowing constraint binds as follows.
µb =
1− βb
βs
1− βb(1− %) > 0 (3.4.5)
where real gross interest rate R is equal with 1
βs
. From Equation 3.4.2, borrower’s
housing stock to non-durable consumption ratio is
Hb
Cb
= βbφ(1− µbθ)[1− (1− δh)βb] (3.4.6)
When the effective relative house price (1− µbθ) rises (steady-state value of Ph,t is 1),
Hb
Cb
falls. The effective relative house price increases when borrower’s credit conditions
get worse (θ lowers). In other words, tightening credit conditions makes borrower’s
housing stock to non-durable consumption ratio reduce.
From Equation 3.3.4, borrower’s debt to housing stock ratio is
Db
Hb
= θPhδh
%
(3.4.7)
When borrower’s credit conditions get worse (θ lowers or % rises), borrower’s debt
to housing stock ratio decreases.
The rest of deterministic steady-state values are listed in appendix 3.B as a full
set.
3.5 Calibration
In South Korea, key statistics show relative stability after the Korean Financial Crisis
1997-1998. Meanwhile, household debt to GDP ratio shows its relative stability since
2003. So we choose the value of parameters using statistics for the period of 2003-2015.
During that period, annual inflation is 2.65% and nominal annual interest rate is
3.20%.15 Therefore the steady-state gross real interest rate (R) is set to be 1.001. In
steady-state, R = 1
βs
. Thus, saver’s discount factor (βs) is set to be 0.998. Calibration
15Calculated by using average CPI and Call Rate.
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for the borrower’s discount factor (βb) is difficult because it does not affect the interest
rate. We set βb = 0.995 so that it is smaller than βs but needs to be large enough to
guarantee an equilibrium in which borrowing constraint will hold. These values are very
close to those in Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) and Iacoviello (2005).16 η is calibrated
to be one so that a Frisch elasticity of labour supply ( 1
η
) is one, as in Justiniano et al.
(2015).17 The population share of borrower (ψ) is set to 0.657, which is average share
of borrower in household during 2012-2015.18 The loan-to-value ratio (θ) is chosen to
be 0.65 to match the household debt-to-GDP ratio (77.1%). The depreciation of houses
(δh), amortisation rate (%)19 and housing preference parameters (φ) are set to 0.005,
0.007 and 0.135 to match three targets. The first target is the house-to-GDP ratio,
which we estimate from National Balance Sheet and National Accounts data as the
average ratio between the market value of houses owned by household and non-profit
organisations and nominal GDP (214.2%). The second target is the household debt
to GDP ratio (77.1%). The last target is the ratio of residential investment to GDP
(4.5%). On the production side, we follow standard practice and set the elasticity of
the production function (α) equal to 0.33, and the depreciation of productive capital
(δk) to 0.025, which match the investment-to-GDP ratio (27.5%). The wage share of
patient household (ν) is set to be 0.8 to match the regular income share of indebted
household (62.9%) in Survey of Household Finances and Living Condition. Investment
adjustment cost parameter in capital production (ζk) is set at 0.5. Adjustment cost
parameter in house production (ζh) is calibrated at 1.0.20 These values of adjustment
16In Justiniano et al. (2015), discount factors of saver and borrower are 0.998 and 0.99, respectively.
17Hansen (1985) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) set household’s utility function to be linear in
leisure, which means η = 0. Iacoviello (2005) set η = 0.01, which is very close to be linear. Meanwhile,
for South Korea, Elekdag et al. (2006) estimated η using Bayesian method and it was 0.889.
18Share of borrower in South Korea can be found in Survey of Household Finances and Living
Condition which is available only since 2012.
19In South Korea, more than 90% of mortgage was interest-only type before 2010. According to
Financial Services Commission, 93.6% of mortgage was interest-only type as of the end of 2010.
Therefore, amortisation rate should be set very low. However, it is set to be higher than house
depreciation rate to cancel out over-estimation of debt level in this model. Without inflation in the
model, debt to GDP ratio is estimated far above than the actual data. In chapter 4, it can be set
much lower because there is a positive inflation in that model.
20Justiniano et al. (2015) assumes an extreme case of nearly fixed supply of house(ζh = 600) and
it is for ’credit liberalisation’ experiment. Chen and Columba (2016) also sets fixed supply of houses
considering unchanged housing stock per capita since 1990s in Sweden. However, in South Korea,
the housing stock per capita has been growing from 1995 to 2015 according to Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport.
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cost parameters are calibrated to match volatility in capital investment and housing
investment. The autocorrelations of shocks (ρa = 0.95, ρ% = ρθ = ρφ = ρg = 0.85) are
set as in Iacoviello (2005) and Justiniano et al. (2015).
Table 3.1: Parameter values
Description Parameter Value
Discount factor of patient household βs 0.998
Discount factor of impatient household βb 0.995
Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1
η
1.000
Population share of borrower ψ 0.657
Capital share of the production function α 0.330
Depreciation of productive capital δk 0.025
Depreciation of houses δh 0.005
Amortisation % 0.007
Adjustment cost parameter in capital investment ζk 0.500
Adjustment cost parameter in house production ζh 1.000
Wage share of patient household ν 0.800
Loan-to-value ratio θ 0.650
Housing preference φ 0.135
Autocorrelation of technology shock ρa 0.950
Autocorrelation of amortisation shock ρ% 0.850
Autocorrelation of credit shock ρθ 0.850
Autocorrelation of housing preference shock ρφ 0.850
Autocorrelation of fiscal shock ρg 0.850
3.6 Quantitative Analysis
Based on the calibrated parameter values, the model performance is assessed by com-
paring the model’s steady-state ratios and second moments with the actual data.
As shown in Table 3.2, the model’s steady-state ratios are close to the actual data.
Consumption to output ratio (51.0%), capital investment to output ratio (30.6%),
residential investment to output ratio (4.3%), housing stock to output ratio (212.5%),
and household debt to output ratio (78.1%) are close to the ratio from the data (50.9%,
27.5%, 4.5%, 214.2%, and 77.1%21, respectively). The fact that household debt related
21Household debt to GDP ratio data is available from the Bank of Korea and Bank for International
Settlement (BIS). We use it from the former (77.1%). The ratio from the latter is 74.2%. For the
purpose of international comparison, the ratio from the latter is usually chosen.
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ratios such as housing stock to output ratio and household debt to output ratio show
fairly close values to the actual data without hampering relevance of the rest of ratios
can be a contribution of this model.
Table 3.2: Steady-state ratios
Ratio Data Model
C
Y
Consumption
Output 50.9% 51.0%
I
Y
Capital investment
Output 27.5% 30.6%
Ih
Y
Residential investment
Output 4.5% 4.3%
H
4× Y
Housing stock
Output 214.2% 212.5%
ψDb
4× Y
Household debt
Output 77.1% 78.1%
Table 3.3 shows results of matching second moments from simulation (periods=1000)
of the model and the actual data. This is crucial for the evaluation of model perfor-
mance especially regarding business cycle analysis. In the table, model 2 indicates
the model with the typical collateral constraint which assumes debt is fully paid back
at the beginning of each period and get a new borrowing (debt) as in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). Model 1 and Model 2 are identical except the bor-
rower’s collateral constraint. Second moments for Model 1 are closer to the household
debt data than those for Model 2 while maintaining similar performance for the rest
of variables. The standard deviation of household debt (Db,t) is much closer to the
data in Model 1 than Model 2. Correlations with output are also closer to the data in
Model 1 than Model 2. The collateral constraint setting (Equation 3.3.4) contributes
for producing volatility and correlation closer to the data especially in household debt
because it assumes only a fraction of household debt is renewed or added as in the
actual data.
The model dynamics responding to the shocks will be shown next. To show
the effects of our collateral constraint clearly, dynamics of Model 1 and Model 2 are
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Table 3.3: Second moments
Standard deviation Data Model 1 Model 2
Ct 0.0108 0.0105 0.0127
It 0.0296 0.0237 0.0324
Ih,t 0.0617 0.0588 0.0374
Yt 0.0113 0.0118 0.0120
Db,t 0.0146 0.0180 0.0928
Correlation with output Data Model 1 Model 2
Ct 0.69 0.93 0.52
It 0.70 0.92 0.77
Ih,t 0.05 0.44 0.31
Db,t 0.35 0.47 -0.19
Notes: 1. All variables are logged and HP-filtered for the period 2003-2015.
2. It is non-residential investment data. It is calculated as follows. It =
Gross fixed capital formation - residential investment.
compared. Responses to four shocks will be illustrated in this chapter: a technology
shock, a LTV ratio shock, a amortisation rate shock, and a housing preference (house
price) shock. First, responses to a technology shock show general characteristics of this
model. Second, responses to the decrease in LTV ratio and the rise in amortisation
rate briefly describe how the South Korean economy with high level of household debt
reacts to the demand-side macroprudential (credit tightening) policies. South Korean
government is trying to slow down the growth rate of household debt by tightening
household credit conditions. These two cases can provide right quantitative dynamics of
key variables in South Korean economy in this situation. Third, we simulate responses
to a negative shock in households’ taste for housing services in order to generate a drop
in house price.
3.6.1 Technology shock
We start with households’ dynamics. Figure 3.2 plots households’ responses to a pos-
itive technology shock of 1%. All the variables are expressed as percent deviations
from their steady-state values. The technology shock raises the wage for both house-
holds because it makes non-durable good producer demand more labour. Thanks to
this wage rise, both households can increase their consumptions either in non-durable
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good or durable good (house). Saver can get additional benefit from the rise in capital
rental rate. So they can both increase non-durable good consumption. Borrower also
purchases more houses because they do not have any other choices. However, saver’s
chose is different from that of borrower. Saver has to lend more money to borrower
to maintain debt market equilibrium. So saver has to reduce house purchases because
house purchase is a kind of saving which can be an alternative to lending. Two models
show different dynamics in house purchase and borrower’s hours worked. The model
1 we build reacts more gradually in household debt related variables due to its struc-
ture of collateral constraint. For example, borrower’s housing stock cannot jump up in
period 1 so it shows gradually increasing shape.
Responses of aggregate variables provide similar picture of dynamics in Figure 3.3.22
Due to the positive technology shock, all the variables except interest rate increase.23
Interest rate is expressed as level deviation from its steady-state value. Two models
show very similar dynamics other than in debt-related variables. Household debt can-
not jump up in Model 1 so that household debt to output ratio drops at once whereas
it gradually decreases in Model 2. Meanwhile, we can see that temporary increase
in wage income leads borrower to have more debt to finance more consumption, in
contrast with the standard representative household model. This is because of the
existence of borrowing constraint which is assumed to always bind in this model as
Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) points out. As we see in households’ dynamics, Model
1 shows more gradual response in household debt than Model 2.
3.6.2 Decreasing LTV ratio
Decrease in LTV ratio immediately affects the amount of impatient household’s bor-
rowing. However, it cannot affect the existing household debt because a lender cannot
force a borrower to accept worsened condition for the existing debt. So decrease in
LTV ratio reduces only new borrowing rather than whole household debt. Responses
22Interest rate is expressed as level deviation from its steady-state value.
23Without investment adjustment cost, interest rate also increases as in a typical RBC model.
However, in this thesis, interest rate falls in response to the technology shock due to the investment
adjustment cost.
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Figure 3.2: Household responses to technology shock
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2.
Figure 3.3: Aggregate responses to technology shock
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate and debt to output are expressed as percent
deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate and debt to output are
percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2.
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of Model 1 demonstrate this mechanism. However, in Model 2, a negative LTV ratio
can affect an entire household debt due to its assumption.24 Figure 3.5 clearly describes
how household debt reacts depending on the assumption of debt and borrowing. Re-
sponses of household debt and household debt to output ratio in Model 2 is about
10 times larger than those in Model 1. Historically, household debt to output ratio
has never changed as dramatically as in Model 2 in response to changes in LTV ratio.
Response of Model 1 is much closer to the historical dynamics of household debt to
output ratio. In case of positive LTV ratio shock, borrower may renew its existing debt
contract to benefit better condition but in reality, the existing debt contracts are not
entirely renewed even along with the increase in LTV ratio.
Figure 3.4 describes households’ responses to a negative LTV ratio shock of 1%.
Borrower is forced to reduce the purchase of houses as collateral. It induces saver to
buy more houses and decrease non-durable good consumption. Borrower can increase
non-durable good consumption thanks to the reduced house purchase, which also leads
borrower to work less. Thus, saver has to work more. The model 1 shows more
moderate responses in household debt related variables as well. For instance, borrower’s
housing stock does not drop suddenly in period 1.
Responses of aggregate variables show more differences between models in Fig-
ure 3.5. Considering the negative characteristics of this shock, we can expect a neg-
ative response of output and decline in house price. Model 1 shows appropriate re-
sults to meet this conjecture. However, Model 2 shows opposite responses in ag-
gregate level. Therefore, it can be said that Model 1 does produce more realistic
aggregate volatility than Model 2 when LTV ratio decreases temporarily and un-
expectedly. This can be a main improvement of our model. Therefore household
debt to output ratio dynamics in Model 1 is much more acceptable than in Model 2.
24In model 2, borrowing is not distinguished from debt.
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Figure 3.4: Household responses to decrease in LTV ratio
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2.
3.6.3 Increasing amortisation rate
Figure 3.6 plots the household impulse responses to 5.5% increase25 in amortisation
rate and compare them with those of negative LTV ratio shock with the same model
(Model 1). For the purpose of comparison, the magnitude of shock is increased to
5.5%, so as to produce the similar reduction in household debt to output ratio with
the case of negative 1% LTV ratio shock.
We can clearly see increase in amortisation rate produces less volatility than lower-
ing LTV ratio. Figure 3.6 shows less fluctuation in all variables on household level. In-
terestingly, borrower’s hours worked keep increasing for more than ten quarters whereas
they decrease when LTV ratio lowers. When amortisation rate increases, borrower
needs to pay back more fraction of its debt every period. So it needs to work more and
reduce non-durable good consumption.
255.5% of amortisation rate is only 0.00039 because its given value is 0.007 as in Table 3.1. Although
change in amortisation rate can apply only to new borrowing like change in LTV ratio, the model does
not have this property to reduce computational complexity. During 2003-2015, average quarterly new
borrowing is 2% of existing debt. So, change in amortisation rate in this model has to be interpreted
as 50 times larger change in amortisation rate of new borrowing. Therefore, increase by 0.00039 can
be interpreted as increase by 0.0195. Amortisation rate 0.007 means 143-year amortisation of debt
and 0.0265 means 38-year amortisation. Although this is not a small change, 38-year amortisation of
debt is still quite loose requirement.
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Figure 3.5: Aggregate responses to decrease in LTV ratio
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Notes: 1. All variables except debt to output are expressed as percent deviation from
their initial steady-state values. Debt to output is percentage point deviation. 2.
Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2.
On aggregate level (Figure 3.7), output increases thanks to more labour supply
whereas it decreases when LTV ratio lowers. Aggregate non-durable good consumption
reduces as borrower decreases it.
3.6.4 Negative house price shock
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 plot the impulse responses to 3.7% decline in housing prefer-
ence and compare them with those of Model 2 with same shock and negative 1% LTV
ratio shock with the Model 1. For the purpose of comparison, the magnitude of shock
is increased to 3.7%, so as to produce the similar magnitude of drop in house price as
in the case of negative 1% LTV ratio shock. If we compare results from Model 1 with
those from Model 2 with same house preference shock, there are interesting differences.
As we can see in Figure 3.9, maximum reduction in output and house price in Model 1
is almost twice as much as in Model 2 despite maximum reduction in household debt is
opposite. This is because in Model 2, capital rental rate increases while it decreases in
Model 1. Increasing capital rental rate in Model 2 makes saver cancel out borrower’s
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Figure 3.6: Household responses to increase in amortisation rate
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Amortisation rate shock, Dotted lines: LTV ratio shock.
Figure 3.7: Aggregate responses to increase in amortisation rate
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate and debt to output are expressed as percent
deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate and debt to output are
percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Amortisation rate shock, Dotted lines: LTV
ratio shock.
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negative responses more than in Model 1. In addition, borrower needs to work more
in Model 2 than in Model 1 in order to compensate the reduced debt.
If we compare dynamics caused by house price drop (housing preference decrease)
with those in response to decreasing LTV ratio, we can see decline in household debt is
much smaller in house price drop than in LTV ratio shock. This is because impatient
household’s borrowing limit is determined by combination of house price and LTV ratio.
Therefore overall effects are smaller both on household level and aggregate level when
housing preference reduces than when LTV ratio decreases. This has an implication
that impacts of house price drop on economy depend on where the shock comes from.
Despite we see the same amount of house price drop, its effects could be quite different
between in case of LTV ratio shock and in case of house price drop.
Figure 3.8: Household responses to decrease in house price
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2, Dashed lines: LTV ratio shock with
Model 1
3.7 Conclusion
It is attempted to build a modified Real Business Cycle model which incorporates bor-
rowing, household debt and house producer to analyse household debt more precisely.
The model is calibrated using the data from South Korea and succeeds in matching the
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Figure 3.9: Aggregate responses to decrease in house price
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate and debt to output are expressed as percent
deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate and debt to output are
percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2, Dashed
lines: LTV ratio shock with Model 1
actual data from South Korea. It is found that macroprudential policies such as LTV
ratio decrease and amortisation rate increase have different effects on households and
whole economy. Increasing amortisation rate is more effective measure in slowing down
the speed of household debt growth in that it produces less volatility in the economy.
In addition, the source of house price drop is very important in estimating its effects
on households and overall economy.
These evidences show that recent demand-side macroprudential policy in South
Korea such as decrease in LTV ratio and prohibition of interest-only mortgage, which
leads to amortisation rate increase, could effectively work in slowing down the growth
rate of household debt. When government implements these macroprudential policies,
appropriate quantitative results from this general equilibrium model can be helpful in
calibrating or finding proper mixture of different policies.
Finally, this model can be extended to take into account monetary policy. In
recent debate on macroprudential policy, it is very crucial how macroprudential policy
works with monetary policy and how much their impacts are different from each other.
In the next chapter, it will be attempted to extend this model for the analysis of
monetary policy effects by including central bank. For this analysis, nominal rigidity
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such as sticky price and real rigidity such as habit formation in consumption and fixed
cost in non-durable good production need to be included because it is well known that
monetary policy analysis is unrealistic without these rigidities.
Appendix
3.A Equilibrium
The model has a unique stationary equilibrium in which impatient household borrows
up to the borrowing limit. The equilibrium conditions are as follows.
[1] λb,t =
1
Cb,t
This can be rewritten as U ′(Cb,t) = λb,t.
[2] Ph,t(1− µb,tθt) = βbEt
[
λb,t+1
λb,t
{
φt+1
Cb,t+1
Hb,t+1
+ (1− δh)Ph,t+1(1− µb,t+1θt+1)
}]
[3] Wb,t = Cb,tLηb,t
This can be rewritten as −U
′(Lb,t)
U ′(Cb,t)
= Wb,t.
[4] λb,t(1− µb,t) = βbEtλb,t+1
{
Rt − (1− %t)µb,t+1
}
This is different from the standard consumption Euler equation because impatient
households has a borrowing constraint. This can be rewritten as
U ′(Cb,t)(1− µb,t) = βbEtU ′(Cb,t+1)
{
Rt − (1− %t)µb,t+1
}
If there is no borrowing constraint (µb,t = µb,t+1 = 0), this reduces to the standard
consumption Euler equation.
[5] Cb,t + Ph,tNb,t +Rt−1Db,t = Wb,tLb,t +Db,t+1 − Tb,t
[6] Db,t+1 − (1− %t−1)Db,t = θtPh,tNb,t
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[7] Nb,t = Hb,t+1 − (1− δh)Hb,t
[8] λs,t =
1
Cs,t
This can be rewritten as U ′(Cs,t) = λs,t.
[9] Ph,t = βsEt
[
λs,t+1
λs,t
{
φt+1
Cs,t+1
Hs,t+1
+ (1− δh)Ph,t+1
}]
[10] Ws,t = Cs,tLηs,t
This can be rewritten as −U
′(Ls,t)
U ′(Cs,t)
= Ws,t.
[11] λs,t = βsRtEtλs,t+1
This is the standard consumption Euler equation for the patient household and can
be rewritten as:
U ′(Cs,t) = βsRtEtU ′(Cs,t+1)
[12] µs,t = βsEt
λs,t+1
λs,t
{Rk,t+1 + (1− δk)µs,t+1}
[13] Ns,t = Hs,t+1 − (1− δh)Hs,t
[14] Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + Ft(It, It−1)
[15] Ft(It, It−1) =
{
1− ζk 12
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2}
It
1 = µs,t
[
1− ζk 12
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− ζk
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
]
[16]
+ βsEt
λs,t+1
λs,t
µs,t+1ζk
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
[17] ν(1− α)YtL−1b,t = ψWb,t
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This can be rewritten as MPLb,t = ψWb,t.
[18] (1− ν)(1− α)YtL−1s,t = (1− ψ)Ws,t
This can be rewritten as MPLs,t = (1− ψ)Ws,t.
[19] αYtK−1t = Rk,t
This can be rewritten as MPKt = Rk,t.
[20] Yt = A1−αt Kαt
[
{ψLb,t}ν{(1− ψ)Ls,t}1−ν
]1−α
1 = Ph,t
{
1− ζh12
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)2
− ζh
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)}
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
[21]
+ βsEt
λs,t+1
λs,t
Ph,t+1ζh
(
Ih,t+1
Ih,t
− 1
)(
Ih,t+1
Ih,t
)2
[22] Nt =
{
1− ζh12
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)2}
Ih,t
[23] ψTb,t = γGt = γgYt
[24] ψDb,t+1 + (1− ψ)Ds,t+1 = 0
[25] Nt = (1− ψ)Ns,t + ψNb,t
[26] Ct = (1− ψ)Cs,t + ψCb,t
[27] Lt = (1− ψ)Ls,t + ψLb,t
[28] Yt = Ct + Ih,t + It +Gt
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + εa,t, εa,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σa2)[29]
ln %t = ρ% ln %t−1 + (1− ρ%) ln %+ ε%,t, ε%,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ%2)[30]
ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + (1− ρθ) ln θ − εθ,t, εθ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σθ2)[31]
lnφt = ρφ lnφt−1 + (1− ρφ) lnφ− εφ,t, εφ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σφ2)[32]
lnGt = ρG lnGt−1 + (1− ρG) lnG+ εG,t, εG,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σG2)[33]
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3.B Steady State
The model can be solved when θ and φ are regarded as parameters. We abstract from
growth (A = 1).
Ph = µs = 1 R =
1
βs
µb =
1− βb
βs
1− βb(1− %) Rk =
1
βs
− (1− δk)
aux1 =
βbφ
(1− µbθ)[1− (1− δh)βb]
aux2 =
βsφ
1− (1− δh)βs
aux3 =
rk
ψα
{ν(1− α)− γg}
1 + aux1δh
[
1 + θPh
%
(R− 1)
]
aux4 =
Rk
α
(1− g)− δk − ψaux3(1 + δhaux1)
(1− ψ)(1 + δhaux2)
Lb =
[
ν(1− α)Rk
αψaux3
] 1
η+1
Ls =
[(1− ν)(1− α)Rk
α(1− ψ)aux4
] 1
η+1
K =
(
α
Rk
) 1
1−α{ψLb}ν{(1− ψ)Ls}1−ν Y = RkK
α
Cb = aux3K Cs = aux4K
λb =
1
Cb
λs =
1
Cs
Hb = aux1Cb Hs = aux2Cs
Nb = δhHb Ns = δhHs
N = (1− ψ)Ns + ψNb Ih = N
Db =
θPhNb
%
Ds =
ψ
ψ − 1Db
C = (1− ψ)Cs + ψCb L = (1− ψ)Ls + ψLb
F = δkK I = F
Wb =
ν(1− α)Y
ψLb
Ws =
(1− ν)(1− α)Y
(1− ψ)Ls
Tb =
γgY
ψ
G = gY
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The steady state can be briefly described as follows.
C
Y
= α[ψaux3 + (1− ψ)aux4]
δk − 1 + 1βs
Ih + I
Y
= αδk[(1− ψ)aux1aux3 + ψaux2aux4] + αδk
δk − 1 + 1βs
N
Y
= αδk[ψaux1aux3 + (1− ψ)aux2aux4]
δk − 1 + 1βs
H
Y
= α[ψaux1aux3 + (1− ψ)aux2aux4]
δk − 1 + 1βs
Db
Y
= αθPhδhaux1aux3
%(δk − 1 + 1βs )
3.C Dynare Code
@#define bc=0
//if bc=0 Model 1
//if bc=1 Model 2
var
LAMBDAB // Lagrangian multiplier on borrower budget constraint
LAMBDAS // Lagrangian multiplier on saver budget constraint
CB // Consumption of borrower
CS // Consumption of saver
C // Aggregate Consumption
THETA // LTV ratio
PHI // Housing preference
Q // House price
HB // Housing stock of borrower
HS // Housing stock of saver
H // Agrregate housing stock
WB // Wage of borrower
WS // Wage of saver
LB // Labour supply of borrower
LS // Labour supply of saver
L // Aggregate Labour supply
MUB // Lagrangian multiplier on borrower borrowing constraint
MUS // Lagrangian multiplier on saver capital accumulation
R // Gross interest rate
AMO // Amortisation rate
DB // Debt of borrower
DS // Debt of saver
NB // Housing investment of borrower
NS // Housing investment of saver
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N // Aggregate Housing investment
RK // Capital rental rate
K // Capital stock
IK // Capital investment
F // Investment adjustment cost
Y // Output
IH // Housing investment
AT // AR(1) technology process
G // Government spending
TB // Tax for borrower
TS // Tax for saver
D2Y // Debt to output
log_Y log_WB log_WS log_L log_LB log_LS log_DB log_CB log_CS log_C
log_HB log_HS log_H log_Q log_IK log_IH log_AT log_THETA log_PHI
;
varexo
EPS_AT // technology shock
EPS_AMO // amortisation rate shock
EPS_THETA // LTV ratio shock
EPS_PHI // housing preference shock
EPS_G // fiscal shock
;
parameters
alppha // capital share
niu // wage share of borrower
bettab // discount factor of borrower
bettas // discount factor of saver
eta // inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
deltak // capital depreciation rate
deltah // housing depreciation rate
psi // population share of borrower
zetak // investment adjustment cost parameter
zetah // adjustment cost parameter in house production
rhoat // autocorrelation technology shock
rhoamo // autocorrelation amortisatino shock
rhotheta // autocorrelation LTV shock
rhophi // autocorrelation housing preference shock
rhog // autocorrelation fiscal shock
sharetb // tax share of borrower
shareg // government spending share in output
;
bettas=.998;
bettab=.995;
eta=1;
psi=.657;
alppha=.33;
deltak=.025;
deltah=.005;
3.C. Dynare Code 45
zetak=0.5;
zetah=1;
niu=.8;
rhoat=.95;
rhoamo=.85;
rhotheta=.85;
rhophi=.85;
shareg=.142;
sharetb=.55;
rhog=.85;
model;
LAMBDAB=1/CB;
@#if bc==0
Q*(1-MUB*THETA)=bettab*(LAMBDAB(+1)/LAMBDAB)*(PHI(+1)*(CB(+1)/HB)+(1-deltah)
*Q(+1)*(1-MUB(+1)*THETA(+1)));
@#else
Q*(1-MUB*THETA)=bettab*(LAMBDAB(+1)/LAMBDAB)*(PHI(+1)*(CB(+1)/HB)+(1-deltah)
*Q(+1));
@#endif
WB=CB*LB^eta;
@#if bc==0
LAMBDAB*(1-MUB)=bettab*LAMBDAB(+1)*(R-(1-AMO)*MUB(+1));
@#else
LAMBDAB*(1-MUB)=bettab*LAMBDAB(+1)*R;
@#endif
CB+Q*NB+R(-1)*DB(-1)=WB*LB+DB-TB;
@#if bc==0
DB-(1-AMO(-1))*DB(-1)=THETA*Q*NB;
@#else
DB=THETA*Q*HB;
@#endif
NB=HB-(1-deltah)*HB(-1);
LAMBDAS=1/CS;
Q=bettas*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*(PHI(+1)*(CS(+1)/HS)+(1-deltah)*Q(+1));
WS=CS*LS^eta;
LAMBDAS=bettas*LAMBDAS(+1)*R;
MUS=bettas*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*(RK(+1)+(1-deltak)*MUS(+1));
NS=HS-(1-deltah)*HS(-1);
K=(1-deltak)*K(-1)+F;
F=(1-zetak*(1/2)*(IK/IK(-1)-1)^2)*IK;
1=MUS*(1-zetak*(1/2)*(IK/IK(-1)-1)^2-zetak*(IK/IK(-1)-1)*(IK/IK(-1)))+bettas
*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*MUS(+1)*zetak*(IK(+1)/IK-1)*(IK(+1)/IK)^2;
niu*(1-alppha)*Y*LB^(-1)=psi*WB;
3.C. Dynare Code 46
(1-niu)*(1-alppha)*Y*LS^(-1)=(1-psi)*WS;
alppha*Y*K(-1)^(-1)=RK;
Y=AT^(1-alppha)*K(-1)^alppha*((psi*LB)^niu*((1-psi)*LS)^(1-niu))^(1-alppha);
1=Q*(1-zetah*(1/2)*(IH/IH(-1)-1)^2-zetah*(IH/IH(-1)-1)*(IH/IH(-1)))+bettas
*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*Q(+1)*zetah*(IH(+1)/IH-1)*(IH(+1)/IH)^2;
N=(1-zetah*(1/2)*(IH/IH(-1)-1)^2)*IH;
psi*TB=sharetb*shareg*Y;
G=psi*TB+(1-psi)*TS;
psi*DB+(1-psi)*DS=0;
N=(1-psi)*NS+psi*NB;
C=(1-psi)*CS+psi*CB;
L=(1-psi)*LS+psi*LB;
Y=C+IH+IK+G;
H=psi*HB+(1-psi)*HS;
D2Y=psi*DB/Y/4;
ln(AT)=rhoat*ln(AT(-1))+EPS_AT;
ln(AMO)=rhoamo*ln(AMO(-1))+(1-rhoamo)*ln(steady_state(AMO))+EPS_AMO;
ln(THETA)=rhotheta*ln(THETA(-1))+(1-rhotheta)*ln(steady_state(THETA))-EPS_THETA;
ln(PHI)=rhophi*ln(PHI(-1))+(1-rhophi)*ln(steady_state(PHI))-EPS_PHI;
ln(G)=rhog*ln(G(-1))+(1-rhog)*ln(steady_state(G))+EPS_G;
log_Y=log(Y);
log_WB=log(WB);
log_WS=log(WS);
log_L=log(L);
log_LB=log(LB);
log_LS=log(LS);
log_DB=log(DB);
log_CB=log(CB);
log_CS=log(CS);
log_C=log(C);
log_HB=log(HB);
log_HS=log(HS);
log_H=log(H);
log_Q=log(Q);
log_IK=log(IK);
log_IH=log(IH);
log_AT=0;
log_THETA=log(THETA);
log_PHI=log(PHI);
end;
steady_state_model;
THETA=.65;
PHI=.135;
AMO=.007;
AT=1;
Q=1;
MUS=1;
R=1/bettas;
@#if bc==0
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MUB=(1-bettab/bettas)/(1-bettab*(1-AMO));
@#else
MUB=1-bettab/bettas;
@#endif
RK=1/bettas-(1-deltak);
@#if bc==0
AUX1=(bettab*PHI)/((1-MUB*THETA)*(1-(1-deltah)*bettab));
@#else
AUX1=(bettab*PHI)/((1-MUB*THETA)-(1-deltah)*bettab);
@#endif
AUX2=(bettas*PHI)/(1-(1-deltah)*bettas);
@#if bc==0
AUX3=((RK*(niu*(1-alppha)-sharetb*shareg))/(psi*alppha))/(1+AUX1*deltah
*(1+((THETA*Q)/AMO)*(R-1)));
@#else
AUX3=((RK*(niu*(1-alppha)-sharetb*shareg))/(psi*alppha))/(1+AUX1*Q*(THETA
*(R-1)+deltah));
@#endif
AUX4=(RK*(1-shareg)/alppha-deltak-psi*AUX3*(1+deltah*AUX1))/((1-psi)
*(1+deltah*AUX2));
LB=((niu*(1-alppha)*RK)/(alppha*psi*AUX3))^(1/(eta+1));
LS=(((1-niu)*(1-alppha)*RK)/(alppha*(1-psi)*AUX4))^(1/(eta+1));
K=(alppha/RK)^(1/(1-alppha))*(psi*LB)^niu*((1-psi)*LS)^(1-niu);
Y=(RK*K)/alppha;
CB=AUX3*K;
CS=AUX4*K;
LAMBDAB=1/CB;
LAMBDAS=1/CS;
HB=AUX1*CB;
HS=AUX2*CS;
NB=deltah*HB;
NS=deltah*HS;
N=(1-psi)*NS+psi*NB;
IH=N;
@#if bc==0
DB=(THETA*Q*NB)/AMO;
@#else
DB=THETA*Q*HB;
@#endif
DS=(psi/(psi-1))*DB;
C=(1-psi)*CS+psi*CB;
L=(1-psi)*LS+psi*LB;
F=deltak*K;
IK=F;
WB=(niu*(1-alppha)*Y)/(psi*LB);
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WS=((1-niu)*(1-alppha)*Y)/((1-psi)*LS);
TB=sharetb*shareg*Y/psi;
G=shareg*Y;
TS=(G-psi*TB)/(1-psi);
H=psi*HB+(1-psi)*HS;
D2Y=psi*DB/Y/4;
log_Y=log(Y);
log_WB=log(WB);
log_WS=log(WS);
log_L=log(L);
log_LB=log(LB);
log_LS=log(LS);
log_DB=log(DB);
log_CB=log(CB);
log_CS=log(CS);
log_C=log(C);
log_HB=log(HB);
log_HS=log(HS);
log_H=log(H);
log_Q=log(Q);
log_IK=log(IK);
log_IH=log(IH);
log_AT=0;
log_THETA=log(THETA);
log_PHI=log(PHI);
end;
resid(1);
steady;
check;
shocks;
var EPS_AT; stderr 0.01;
var EPS_THETA; stderr 0.01;
var EPS_AMO; stderr 0.055;
var EPS_PHI; stderr 0.037;
var EPS_G; stderr 0.01;
end;
options_.pruning=1;
stoch_simul(periods=1000,hp_filter=1600, order = 2,irf=100);
Chapter 4
Household Debt, Credit Tightening
and Monetary Policy in South
Korea: a medium-scale DSGE
Model
4.1 Introduction
Elevated concern on the financial stability after the recent Great Recession turns many
policymakers’ and researchers’ attention to macroprudential policy (credit tightening)
and its relationship with monetary policy. Suh (2012) and Svensson (2016) argue that
monetary policy and macroprudential policy should be separated because they are
efficient for different target variables whereas Woodford (2012) argues that financial
stability should be an objective of monetary policy.
High and rising household debt has been a main concern regarding financial stabil-
ity in South Korea for more than ten years. To slow down the growth rate of household
debt, various policy efforts has been implemented by policymakers. In this chapter,
I investigate which policy measures are more effective in reducing household debt to
output ratio using medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with the collateral con-
straint which is introduced in the previous chapter. Literature using DSGE model with
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a collateral constraint usually does not distinguish household debt from borrowing by
assuming that household debt is fully paid back every period. This assumption may
be good enough to analyse effects of credit liberalisation but it could be too strong in
investigating effects of credit tightening. Moreover, when household debt is a concrete
policy target, it needs to be defined clearly in a model separating from borrowing.
Clear separation of household debt (stock) from borrowing (flow) makes analysis more
realistic and precise at least in household debt related variables. Available credit tight-
ening measures are LTV ratio and amortisation rate which are all demand-side credit
tightening measures.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 highlights key liter-
ature. Section 4.3 describes the model. Section 4.4 presents calibration of parameter
values. Quantitative Analysis is illustrated in section 4.5. Finally, conclusion is pre-
sented in section 4.6.
4.2 Literature Review
There are recent literature that compares effects of macroprudential policy and mone-
tary policy in general equilibrium models. This literature can be grouped by either the
type of macroprudential policy measures or the types of the model used for analysis.
Type of macroprudential policy measures can be classified into two categories. One
is supply-side measures such as bank capital requirement and maximum leverage ra-
tio. The other is demand-side measures such as LTV ratio, amortisation rate and tax.
When supply-side measures are analysed, models commonly incorporate a banking sec-
tor because the policy target is a banking sector. In case of analysis of demand-side
measures, collateral constraint is added into models as a key feature because finan-
cial demand works through collateral constraint. The focus of this chapter is limited
to demand-side macroprudential policy, so that the model used in this chapter is in
line with models with collateral constraint as in Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) and
Iacoviello (2005).
Literature on supply-side macroprudential policy focus mainly on capital require-
ments. Angeloni and Faia (2013) find the optimal combination of capital requirements
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and monetary policy, which is mildly anti-cyclical capital requirements and a mone-
tary policy which reacts to inflation and asset prices by using a DSGE model with a
banking sector. Angelini et al. (2014) show time-varying capital requirements can be a
useful complement to monetary policy by using a DSGE model with a banking sector
as well as collateral constraint. Collard et al. (2017) argue that macroprudential policy
such as capital requirements is appropriate for accommodating risk-taking incentives
and monetary policy is appropriate for alleviating macroeconomic effects of macropru-
dential policy by using a DSGE model with a banking sector. The main topic among
demand-side macroprudential policy measures is LTV ratio.
4.3 Model
The model in this chapter is a medium-scale DSGE model with a financial friction
(collateral constraint). This builds on a Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) and Justini-
ano et al. (2015). Based on the model in chapter 3, habit formation in non-durable
good consumption, price rigidity and fixed cost in intermediate-good production and
monetary authority are added mainly for monetary policy analysis. Price rigidity ba-
sically follows Calvo price-setting and the way of price-setting by non-optimal setters
is based on Christiano et al. (2005). Fixed cost of production is also based on Chris-
tiano et al. (2005). Monetray policy follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule. Credit
tightening is assumed to be implemented as exogenous shocks. The rest of structure
and assumptions of the model are the same as in chapter 3.
Impatient Household
Impatient household’s utility function is the same as in chapter 3 except habit forma-
tion.
Ub,t = ln (Cb,t − hCb,t−1) + φt lnHb,t −
L1+ηb,t
1 + η (4.3.1)
where h is the consumption habit formation parameter.
The log of housing preference φt follows AR(1) process as in chapter 3.
lnφt = ρφ lnφt−1 + (1− ρφ) lnφ+ εφ,t (4.3.2)
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Impatient household maximises its lifetime expected utility at time 0 as in chap-
ter 3.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtbUb,t
Budget constraint is different from that in chapter 3 because of an inflation. In
this economy, we need to introduce an inflation for monetary policy analysis. As a
result, we need to distinguish nominal variables from real variables.
Cb,t + qtNb,t + (Rt−1 − 1 + %t−1)db,t
pit
≤ wb,tLb,t − Tb,t + db,t+1 − (1− %t−1)db,t
pit
(4.3.3)
where pit(= PtPt−1 ) is an inflation at time t, Pt is the nominal price of non-durable good,
qt(= Ph,tPt ) is real house price, wb,t(=
Wb,t
Pt
) is the real wage, Tb,t is real lump-sum tax
and transfer from the government and db,t+1(= Db,t+1Pt ) is the amount of real debt at
the end of time t and at the beginning of time t+1. The interest paid for existing real
debt at time t is (Rt−1 − 1)db,tpit where Rt−1 is gross nominal interest rate.
Impatient household’s nominal collateral constraint is the same as in chapter 3.
However, real debt is affected by inflation.
db,t+1 − (1− %t−1)db,t
pit
≤ θtqtNb,t (4.3.4)
%t is exogenous and its log follows AR(1) process.
ln %t = ρ% ln %t−1 + (1− ρ%) ln %+ ε%,t (4.3.5)
θt is exogenous and its log follows AR(1) process.
ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + (1− ρθ) ln θ + εθ,t (4.3.6)
Lagrangian for impatient household can be defined as follows.
L =E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
[
ln (Cb,t − hCb,t−1) + φt lnHb,t −
L1+ηb,t
1 + η + λb,t[wb,tLb,t − Tb,t + db,t+1
− Cb,t − qt{Hb,t+1 − (1− δh)Hb,t} −Rt−1db,t
pit
] + λb,tµb,t
[
(1− %t−1)db,t
pit
+ θtqt{Hb,t+1 − (1− δh)Hb,t} − db,t+1}
]]
(4.3.7)
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This function is maximised with respect to Cb,t, Hb,t+1, Lb,t and db,t+1.
Patient Household
Patient household also maximises its lifetime expected utility at time 0 as in chapter 3.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
[
ln (Cs,t − hCs,t−1) + φt lnHs,t − L
1+η
s,t
1 + η
]
(4.3.8)
Budget constraint is
Cs,t + qtNs,t +
It
1− ψ +Rt−1
ds,t
pit
≤ ws,tLs,t + rk,t Kt1− ψ +
Πs,t
Pt
+ ds,t+1 − Ts,t (4.3.9)
where Is,t(= It1−ψ ) is patient household’ investment in production capital, Ks,t(=
Kt
1−ψ )
is the stock of capital owned by patient household, and rk,t(= Rk,tPt ) is real capital rental
rate, and Πs,t is the share of nominal profits of the intermediate-good producers owned
by the savers.
The stock of capital is determined by the following equation as in chapter 3.
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + Ft (4.3.10)
Ft(It, It−1) is given by
Ft(It, It−1) = AI,t
[
1− Sk( It
It−1
)
]
It (4.3.11)
where AI,t is investment-specific technology shock and its log follows AR(1) process.
lnAI,t = ρI lnAI,t−1 + εI,t (4.3.12)
Lagrangian for patient household can be defined as follows.
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
[
ln (Cs,t − hCs,t−1) + φt lnHs,t − L
1+η
s,t
1 + η + λs,t
[
ws,tLs,t + rk,t
Kt
1− ψ
+ Πs,t
Pt
+ ds,t+1 − Ts,t − Cs,t − qt
{
Hs,t+1 − (1− δh)Hs,t
}
− It1− ψ −Rt−1
ds,t
pit
]
+ λs,tµs,t1− ψ
[
AI,t
{
1− ζk 12
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2}
It −Kt+1 + (1− δk)Kt
]]
(4.3.13)
where λs,t is the current-value Lagrangian multiplier on budget constraint. This func-
tion is maximised with respect to Cs,t, Hs,t+1, Ls,t, ds,t+1 and Kt+1.
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Non-durable Good Producers
There is one final non-durable good, Yt, which is produced by the following technology.
Yt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
(4.3.14)
where i ∈ [0, 1], ε > 1. ε is the elasticity of substitution among goods and Yt(i) is an
ith intermediate-good. Final non-durable good producer maximises profits subject to
the production function above and demands for intermediate-goods as follows.
max
Yt(i)
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di (4.3.15)
Therefore,
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Yt (4.3.16)
where Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0 Pt(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
There are a continuum of intermediate-good producers which produce a differen-
tiated good Yt(i) at a price Pt(i). The production function of intermediate-good pro-
ducers is described by a Cobb-Douglas function with constant return to scale (CRS).
Intermediate-good producers combine labours of both types of households and capital.
Yt(i) = A1−αt Kt(i)α
[
{ψLb,t(i)}ν{(1− ψ)Ls,t(i)}1−ν
]1−α − AtΓ (4.3.17)
where 0 < α < 1 and 0 < ν < 1. Γ is the fixed cost of production which is chosen
to ensure that steady-state profits are zero as in Christiano et al. (2005) and At is
exogenous labour-augmenting (or, equivalently, Harrod-neutral) technological progress.
The level of technology is non-stationary and it follows a stationary AR(1) process in
the log. We abstract from growth.
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + εa,t, εa,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σa2) (4.3.18)
Intermediate-good producers maximise profits subject to the production function above.
Intermediate-good producers solve two-stages problems. Firstly, they minimise their
real costs.
min
Lb,t(i),Ls,t(i),Kt(i)
wb,tψLb,t(i) + ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t(i) + rk,tKt(i) (4.3.19)
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subject to their supply curve:
Yt(i) = A1−αt Kt(i)α
[
{ψLb,t(i)}ν{(1− ψ)Ls,t(i)}1−ν
]1−α − AtΓ
The Lagrangian is
L = wb,tψLb,t(i) + ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t(i) + rk,tKt(i) + ςt(i)
[
Yt(i)
− A1−αt Kt(i)α
[
{ψLb,t(i)}ν{(1− ψ)Ls,t(i)}1−ν
]1−α
+ AtΓ
]
(4.3.20)
where ςt(i) is the current-value Lagrangian multiplier on supply curve. The real
marginal cost is identical across producers. Therefore ςt(i) is equal to mct.
Secondly, intermediate-good producers maximise their discounted real profits. Fol-
lowing Calvo (1983), a fraction 1 − ξp of them can set their nominal prices optimally
in each period. The rest of them simply index their nominal prices to lagged aggregate
inflation as in Christiano et al. (2005). The intermediate-good price in period t is:
Pt(i) =

P ∗t (i) if Pt(i) chosen optimally
pit−1Pt−1(i) otherwise
where pit = PtPt−1 .
The price of an intermediate-good producer which can set its price optimally only
in period t is as follows in subsequent period:
Pt+1(i) = pitP ∗t (i)
Pt+2(i) = pit+1pitP ∗t (i)
...
Pt+τ (i) =
τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1P ∗t (i)
Then, the real price of an intermediate-good producer which can set its price
optimally only in period t is as follows at time t+ τ .
Pt+τ (i)
Pt+τ
=
τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
P ∗t (i)
Pt+τ
Intermediate-good producers discount profits by βs λs,t+τλs,t , which is their discount factor,
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as well as a fraction of non-optimal price-setting producers, ξp. Then, intermediate-
good producers maximise their real profits as follows:
max
Pt(i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βsξp)τ
λs,t+τ
λs,t
[( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
Pt(i)
Pt+τ
−mct+τ
)
Yt+τ (i)
]
(4.3.21)
subject to
Yt+τ (i) =
( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
Pt(i)
Pt+τ
)−ε
Yt+τ
where mct+τ is the real marginal cost at time t+ τ .
Substituting the demand curve in the objective function, we get:
max
Pt(i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βsξp)τ
λs,t+τ
λs,t
[{( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
Pt(i)
Pt+τ
)1−ε
−
( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
Pt(i)
Pt+τ
)−ε
mct+τ
}
Yt+τ
]
This can be transformed as follows.
max
Pt(i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βsξp)τ
λs,t+τ
λs,t
[{( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−ε
−
( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
mct+τ
}
Yt+τ
]
The first order condition is:
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βsξp)τλs,t+τ
[{
(1− ε)
( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
)1−εPt(i)
Pt
+ ε
( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
)−ε
mct+τ
}
Yt+τ
]
= 0
P ∗t (i) is equal to P ∗t because we only consider a symmetric equilibrium. Then, this
condition yields the optimal price as follows:
P ∗t
Pt
= ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
τ=0(βsξp)τλs,t+τ
(∏τ
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
)1−ε
mct+τYt+τ
Et
∑∞
τ=0(βsξp)τλs,t+τ
(∏τ
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
)−ε
Yt+τ
Let
Zt =
ε
ε− 1Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βsξp)τλs,t+τ
( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
)1−ε
mct+τYt+τ
Mt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βsξp)τλs,t+τ
( τ∏
s=1
pit+s−1
pit+s
)−ε
Yt+τ
and then the first order condition can be briefly expressed as
pi∗t =
Zt
Mt
(4.3.22)
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where pi∗t =
P ∗t
Pt
.
The price index evolves as follows.
P 1−εt = ξp(pit−1Pt−1)1−ε + (1− ξp)P ∗t 1−ε
Dividing by P 1−εt , we get:
1 = ξp
(pit−1
pit
)1−ε
+ (1− ξp)pi∗t 1−ε (4.3.23)
House Producer
The production functions of house producer is the same as in chapter 3.
Nt = AH,t
{
1− Sh,t
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
)}
Ih,t (4.3.24)
where AH,t is housing investment-specific technology shock and its log follows AR(1)
process.
lnAH,t = ρH lnAH,t−1 + εH,t (4.3.25)
House producer maximises its real profits as follows.
max
Ih,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t
[
qt
{
1− ζh12
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)2}
Ih,t − Ih,t
]
(4.3.26)
where λs,t is the marginal utility of income of saver, that is to say, the current-value
Lagrangian multiplier on budget constraint of patient household.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy
The government spending follows AR(1) process in its log:
lnGt = ρG lnGt−1 + (1− ρG) lnG+ εG,t (4.3.27)
where 0 < ρG < 1 and εG,t is an i.i.d. zero mean normal random disturbance with
constant variance σG2.
The government raises revenue via lump sum taxes and balances its budget:
Gt = gYt = ψTb,t + (1− ψ)Ts,t (4.3.28)
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Thus, patient household can only lend to impatient household, and the net supply
of borrowing is zero.
The share of taxes borrower pays is set to be γ. This indicates the degree of
government redistribution. As γ decreases, government redistributes more to borrower.
ψTb,t = γGt = γgYt (4.3.29)
Monetary policy follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule (Taylor, 1993) as follows.
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ωR[(pit
pi
)ωpi(Yt
Y
)ωY ]
eξr,t (4.3.30)
where pi is the central bank’s inflation target. The parameters ωR, ωpi, and ωY capture
the degree of smoothing in monetary policy, and the policy weight on inflation, and
output, respectively. eξr,t is a monetary policy shock with an expected value of one.
Aggregation and Market Clearing Conditions
Total nominal profits in the economy is the integral of profits across intermediate-good
producers:
Πt =
∫ 1
0
Πt(i)di
=
∫ 1
0
{Pt(i)Yt(i)− [Wb,tψLb,t(i) +Ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t(i) +Rk,tKt(i)]}di
=
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di−Wb,tψ
∫ 1
0
Lb,t(i)di−Ws,t(1− ψ)
∫ 1
0
Ls,t(i)di−Rk,t
∫ 1
0
Kt(i)di
Since
∫ 1
0 Lb,t(i)di = Lb,t,
∫ 1
0 Ls,t(i)di = Ls,t and
∫ 1
0 Kt(i)di = Kt, we get:
Πt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di−Wb,tψLb,t −Ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t −Rk,tKt
Using the demand function for goods:
Πt = P εt Yt
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−εdi−Wb,tψLb,t −Ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t −Rk,tKt
Since
∫ 1
0 Pt(i)1−εdi = P 1−εt , we get:
Πt = PtYt −Wb,tψLb,t −Ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t −Rk,tKt
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Then, total real profits in the economy are as follows:
Πt
Pt
= Yt − wb,tψLb,t − ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t − rk,tKt
qtNt = Ih,t because profits of house producer are assumed to be zero.
Debt market is cleared as follows.
ψdb,t+1 + (1− ψ)ds,t+1 = 0 (4.3.31)
The government balances its budget.
Plugging all these conditions to the aggregated budget constraints of both type of
households below,
(1− ψ)Cs,t + ψCb,t + qt[(1− ψ)Ns,t + ψNb,t] + It + Rt−1
pit
[(1− ψ)ds,t + ψdb,t]
= wb,tψLb,t + ws,t(1− ψ)Ls,t + rk,tKt + (1− ψ)Πs,t
Pt
− [(1− ψ)Ts,t + ψTb,t]
+ (1− ψ)ds,t+1 + ψdb,t+1
where (1− ψ)Πs,t = Πt we can get the economy’s resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + Ih,t + It +Gt (4.3.32)
where Ct = (1− ψ)Cs,t + ψCb,t.
4.4 Parameter Estimates
4.4.1 Methods and Data
I linearise the equations describing the equilibrium around the steady state (See the ap-
pendix 4.A, appendix 4.B, appendix 4.C for the equilibrium equations, the steady state
and the log-linearised equations). The Bayesian estimation is used to set up parame-
ter values and some parameters are calibrated before the Bayesian estimation. Prior
distributions for the parameters are chosen and posterior distributions are estimated
by using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with 500,000 draws.
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The sample period for the estimation is 2003:Q1 to 2015:Q4 as in chapter 3.
Eight series of quarterly data are employed as observable data: real GDP, real private
consumption, residential investment, non-residential investment, employment, CPI in-
flation, uncollateralised overnight call rate, real house prices.1
Obst = [∆lnY obst ,∆lnCobst ,∆lnIobsh,t ,∆lnIobst ,∆lnLobst , piobst , Robst ,∆lnqobst ]
Real GDP, real private consumption, residential investment, non-residential in-
vestment and employment are divided by population and real house prices are the
nominal house prices divided by CPI inflation.
4.4.2 Calibrated Parameters
Table 4.1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Discount factor of patient household βs 0.998
Discount factor of impatient household βb 0.995
Population share of borrowers ψ 0.657
Average net mark-up of intermediate-good producers 1
ε−1 0.15
Depreciation of productive capital δk 0.025
Depreciation of houses δh 0.005
Amortisation % 0.001
The discount factors of saver and borrower (βs and βb), depreciation rates of capital
and housing stock (δk and δh), population share of borrowers (ψ), average net mark-up
of intermediate-good producers (ψ) and amortisation rate (%) are calibrated.
During that period, annual inflation is 2.65%, so that pi is set to be 1.006. The
steady-state gross interest rate (R) is chosen to be 1.008, which matches the average
annual Call Rate 3.20%. In steady-state, R = pi
βs
. Therefore, saver’s discount factor
(βs) is calibrated at 0.998 as in chapter 3. Amortisation rate is set very low (0.001)
as mentioned in chapter 3. Before 2010, it used to be very low but it is increasing
very fast recently. Interest-only mortgage ratio was 93.6% as of the end of 2010 but
1All data are obtained from the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr).
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reduced to 61.1% as of the end of 2015. This dramatic change is a motivation to build
a model which can simulate responses to amortisation rate shock. ε is calibrated at
7.67 so that average net mark-up of intermediate-good producers is calibrated at 0.15.
Depreciation rates of capital and housing stock (δk and δh) and population share of
borrowers (ψ) are the same as in chapter 3.
The model’s steady-state ratios2 are very close to the actual data as shown in
Table 4.2, but housing stock to output ratio from the model (229.1%) is quite higher
than those from the data (214.2%).
Table 4.2: Steady-state ratios
Ratio Data Model
C
Y
Consumption
Output 50.9% 50.9%
I
Y
Non-residential investment
Output 27.5% 30.3%
Ih
Y
Residential investment
Output 4.5% 4.6%
H
4× Y
Housing stock
Output 214.2% 229.1%
ψDb
4× Y
Household debt
Output 77.1% 81.0%
4.4.3 Prior Distributions
Priors are illustrated in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. They are chosen based on previous
studies (Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Lee and Song, 2015). For the adjustment costs
in capital investment and house production (ζk and ζh), I use a gamma distribution
with a prior mean of 4.0 and standard deviation of 1.5. I set a prior mean on habit
formation parameter in consumption (h) at 0.5. I choose a beta prior for the Calvo
price parameter (ξp) with a mean of 0.75 and standard deviation of 0.1. For the capital
2These ratios are results from the model using the calibrated parameters and the mean estimates
shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Priors and posteriors of the structural parameters
Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. 5% 95%
ζk Gamma 4.00 1.50 3.086 1.704 0.0769 5.2096
ζh Gamma 4.00 1.50 6.467 1.924 3.504 9.712
h Beta 0.50 0.10 0.354 0.096 0.195 0.507
ξp Beta 0.75 0.10 0.447 0.031 0.394 0.491
α Beta 0.33 0.02 0.327 0.011 0.309 0.343
ν Beta 0.80 0.10 0.797 0.010 0.782 0.813
ωR Beta 0.80 0.10 0.882 0.023 0.848 0.918
ωY Beta 0.20 0.10 0.103 0.060 0.014 0.189
ωpi Normal 3.00 0.20 3.005 0.197 2.669 3.312
θ Beta 0.65 0.10 0.626 0.046 0.552 0.703
φ Normal 0.20 0.10 0.147 0.020 0.114 0.180
η Gamma 1.00 0.20 1.316 0.260 0.898 1.73
share of the production function (α), I use a beta distribution with a prior mean of 0.33
and standard deviation of 0.02. I select the prior mean of 0.80 for the wage share of
impatient household (ν) with a standard deviation of 0.1. I set the prior mean for the
LTV ratio (θ) to be 0.65 with a standard deviation of 0.1. For the housing preference
parameter (φ), I use a normal distribution with a mean of 0.20 and standard deviation
of 0.1. I set a prior mean on inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply3 at 1.0 with a
standard deviation of 0.2. I choose a prior mean of 0.8 and standard deviation of 0.1
for the monetary policy smoothing parameter (ωR). For the monetary policy weight
on output(ωY ), a beta distribution with a mean of 0.2 and standard deviation of 0.1.
I use a normal distribution with a mean of 3.0 as in Lee and Song (2015) to match
the volatility in inflation. Inverse gamma priors are used for the standard errors of the
shocks and beta priors for the persistence parameters.
3Strictly speaking, 1/η has to be interpreted as the elasticity with which marginal people substitute
in and out of employment with respect to a change in the wage because employment data are used for
its estimation. If hours worked data is used for its estimation, it can be interpreted as the elasticity
of labour supply (Christiano et al., 2010).
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Table 4.4: Priors and posteriors of the shock processes
Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. 5% 95%
ρa Beta 0.80 0.10 0.809 0.087 0.677 0.953
ρG Beta 0.80 0.10 0.515 0.122 0.312 0.705
ρ% Beta 0.80 0.10 0.800 0.099 0.651 0.957
ρθ Beta 0.80 0.10 0.722 0.094 0.568 0.823
ρφ Beta 0.80 0.10 0.867 0.068 0.782 0.961
ρI Beta 0.80 0.10 0.776 0.105 0.615 0.947
ρH Beta 0.80 0.10 0.858 0.089 0.727 0.991
σa Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.016
σG Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.049 0.012 0.036 0.071
σr Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.002 0.0003 0.002 0.003
σ% Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.014
σθ Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.048 0.013 0.027 0.068
σφ Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.109 0.070 0.002 0.020
σI Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.009
σH Inv. gamma 0.01 2.00 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.012
4.4.4 Posterior Distributions
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 describe the posterior mean and 95 probability intervals for
the estimated parameters. The posterior mean of adjustment cost parameter of capital
investment ζh is 6.47 which is higher than the mean of ζk, 3.09. The degree of habit
formation is moderate (h=0.354). The price stickiness in non-durable good production
is 0.447 which is also moderate. This implies that prices are re-optimised about every
six or seven months. Capital share is 0.327 which is very close to the prior mean,
0.33. Wage share of impatient household (ν) is 0.797, which implies that indebted
households in South Korea are usually in higher income group. This result is totally
opposite to the result from Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The posterior mean of LTV
ratio is 0.626, which is fairly close to the prior mean and quite lower than 0.925 in
Lee and Song (2015). The estimated value of housing preference parameter φ (0.147)
is close to the calibrated value 0.12 in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and lower than 2.0
in Lee and Song (2015). The posterior mean of η (1.32) is close to the conventionally
calibrated value of 1. Estimated values of monetary policy rule related parameters are
in line with previous studies. The persistence of shocks except government spending is
higher than 0.7 as shown in Table 4.4.
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4.5 Properties of the Estimated Model
4.5.1 Cyclical properties
Table 4.5 shows results of matching second moments from the model and data. In
the table, Model 2 indicates the model with the typical collateral constraint as in the
previous chapter. Model 1 and Model 2 are identical except the borrower’s collateral
constraint. In terms of standard deviation, two models show quite different perfor-
mance in household debt. In household debt (Db,t), Model 2 shows too high volatility
but standard deviation of Model 1 is much closer to the data. Both models fail to show
large enough volatility in residential investment. In correlation with output, Model 2
fails to match the correlation in household debt but Model 1 is closer to the data. Both
models fail to show proper correlation in residential investment. Results imply that at
least regarding household debt, Model 1 can show relatively realistic second moments.
This implication will be confirmed in impulse responses as well.
Table 4.5: Second moments
Standard deviation Data Model 1 Model 2
Ct 0.0108 0.0127 0.0132
It 0.0296 0.0203 0.0230
Ih,t 0.0617 0.0287 0.0245
Yt 0.0113 0.0110 0.0110
Db,t 0.0146 0.0303 0.1615
Correlation with output Data Model 1 Model 2
Ct 0.69 0.65 0.52
It 0.70 0.68 0.70
Ih,t 0.05 0.33 0.25
Db,t 0.35 0.55 -0.09
Note: All variables are logged and HP-filtered for the period 2003-2015.
2. It is non-residential investment data. It is calculated as follows. It =
Gross fixed capital formation - residential investment.
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4.5.2 Impulse Responses
Technology shock
Although the models in this chapter and chapter 3 share common structure, there are
some differences in responses to shocks. In addition, difference in collateral constraint
also affect more than in chapter 3, that is, gap between Model 1 and Model 2 becomes
slightly wider.
Overall responses are far more gradual and last longer than in chapter 3 because of
the price stickiness and habit formation in this model. The most notable difference can
be found in household debt and household debt to output ratio. As shown in Figure 4.2,
household debt keeps increasing after the shock and the amount of its increase is much
larger than in the previous chapter model. In addition, household debt to output ratio
quickly recovers its initial level and gradually increases thereafter to above its initial
level in response to technology shock whereas it suddenly drops and takes long time
to recover its initial level in the previous chapter model. There are two factors make
these happen. One is relative house price. In this model, technology shock induces
higher house price for longer time than in the previous chapter model. Higher house
price means higher value in collateral. The other is inflation. When inflation falls, real
debt grows. If these two factors work rapidly and strongly enough, household debt to
output ratio can increase in spite of rise in output. Model 2 shows little differences
from Model 1 in most of variables except household debt and household debt to output
ratio. In Model 2, responses of those two variables are too volatile to be regarded as
realistic responses to 1% technology shock. Model 1 shows relatively realistic volatility
regarding household debt.
Figure 4.1 plots households’ responses. Borrower’s housing stock in Model 1 re-
covers its steady-state level within two quarters and increase thereafter for a long
period but in Model 2, it jumps up and keeps above its steady-state level thereafter.
This affects saver’s responses in opposite direction. Increasing household debt boosts
borrower’s non-durable good consumption and reduces its hours worked.
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Figure 4.1: Household responses to technology shock
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2.
Figure 4.2: Aggregate responses to technology shock
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as percent deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate, inflation and
debt to output are percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines:
Model 2.
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Decreasing LTV ratio
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 plot responses to a negative LTV ratio shock of 1%. Overall
results are not very different from those in the previous chapter. Only notable difference
can be found in magnitude of responses of house prices between Model 1 and 2. They
are almost twice as much as in chapter 3. In this context, Model 1 looks more realistic
than Model 2 because Model 2’s responses are too much, especially related to household
debt.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we can intuitively expect negative responses
of output and house price. Model 1 shows appropriate results to meet this conjecture.
However, Model 2 shows opposite responses not only in these two variables but also
in almost every variable. Therefore, it can be said that Model 1 does produce more
realistic responses than Model 2 when LTV ratio decreases temporarily and unexpect-
edly. Therefore household debt to output ratio dynamics in Model 1 is much more
acceptable than in Model 2.
Figure 4.3: Household responses to decrease in LTV ratio
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
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Figure 4.4: Aggregate responses to decrease in LTV ratio
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate, inflation and debt to output are expressed
as percent deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate, inflation and
debt to output are percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines:
Model 2.
Increasing amortisation rate
Figure 4.5 plots the household impulse responses to 34% increase4 in amortisation rate
and compare them with those to negative 1% LTV ratio shock with the same model
(Model 1). For the purpose of comparison, the magnitude of shock is increased to 34%,
so as to produce almost the same reduction in household debt to output ratio with the
case of negative 1% LTV ratio shock.
Overall, responses of variables both in household and aggregate levels are not
different from those in the previous chapter. As mentioned in chapter 3, increasing
434% of amortisation rate is only 0.00034 because its given value is 0.001 as in Table 4.1. Although
change in amortisation rate can apply only to new borrowing like change in LTV ratio, the model does
not have this property to reduce computational complexity. During 2003-2015, average quarterly new
borrowing is 2% of existing debt. So, change in amortisation rate in this model can be interpreted
as 50 times larger change in amortisation rate of new borrowing. Therefore, increase by 0.00034 can
be interpreted as increase by 0.017 in amortisation rate of new borrowing. Therefore this change
in amortisation rate is actually from 0.001 (1000-year amortisation of debt) to 0.018 (56-year) in
amortisation rate of new borrowing. Although this is a big change in amortisation rate of new
borrowing, 56-year amortisation of debt is still quite generous.
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amortisation rate produces less volatility in the economy given the same amount of
reduction in household debt to output ratio.
Figure 4.5: Household responses to increase in amortisation rate
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Amortisation rate shock, Dotted lines: LTV ratio shock.
Negative house price shock
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 plot the impulse responses to 3.5% decline in housing prefer-
ence and compare them with those of Model 2 with same shock and Model 1’s responses
to negative 1% LTV ratio shock. For the purpose of comparison, the magnitude of shock
is increased to 3.5%, so as to produce the similar magnitude of drop in house price as
in the case of negative 1% LTV ratio shock.
As shown in chapter 3, household debt declines much smaller than in LTV ratio
shock. Output decreases to some degree in Model 1 while it shows little response in
Model 2. Aggregate consumption slightly goes up in response to drop in house price.
This result does not conform with literature (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Iacoviello and
Neri, 2010) which find a positive relationship between on house price and consumption
(housing wealth effect). Iacoviello and Neri (2010) uses the same collateral constraint
with Model 2. According to Iacoviello and Neri (2010), borrower’s consumption can
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Figure 4.6: Aggregate responses to increase in amortisation rate
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate, inflation and debt to output are expressed
as percent deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate, inflation and
debt to output are percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Amortisation rate shock,
Dotted lines: LTV ratio shock.
increase following the rise in house price thanks to more borrowing as Model 2 shows
considerable change in household debt in response to house price shock. However,
increase (decrease) in borrowing may not be as large as Model 2 shows unless existing
mortgage contracts are renewed to utilise a better (worse) condition. If a house price
rise affects only new borrowing, household debt cannot increase (decrease) sharply.
Although Model 1’s consumption response does not conform with literature, its output
response may be closer to the data and literature than Model 2’s output response.
Monetary policy shock
Model 1 shows less volatility in response to monetary policy shock (25bp increase in
annual policy rate) than Model 2 as shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. Notable
differences can be found in household debt related variables. In Model 2, household
debt reduces immediately as house price declines in response to monetary tightening.
In contrast, household debt rather increases in Model 1 because lower house price neg-
atively affects only on new borrowing and the existing (real) household debt increases
due to the lowered inflation. If price-stickiness is high enough (when ξp is higher than
0.6), household debt can slightly decrease in response to monetary policy tightening.
But with the estimated value of ξp (0.447), household debt cannot be reduced by rais-
4.5. Properties of the Estimated Model 71
Figure 4.7: Household responses to decrease in house price
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2, Dashed lines: LTV ratio shock with
Model 1
Figure 4.8: Aggregate responses to decrease in house price
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debt to output are percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines:
Model 2, Dashed lines: LTV ratio shock with Model 1
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ing policy rate. In model 2, household debt decreases much more than output, so as to
make household debt to output ratio go down. In model 1, household debt increases
while output declines, so that household debt to output ratio rises. These results im-
ply that effects of monetary policy tightening on real household debt level depend on
price-stickiness and with the estimated degree of price-stickiness, household debt level
slightly increases when policy rate rises.
Figure 4.9: Household responses to monetary policy shock (25bp ↑)
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines: Model 2.
Monetary policy shock with different LTV ratios
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 plot responses to a monetary policy shock (25bp increase in
annual policy rate) under three different LTV ratios; 0.75, 0.623 and 0.5. Under lower
LTV ratio which means tighter credit conditions, household debt fluctuates by smaller
amount as expected. Other aggregate variables seem to show no significant differences.
If we look at the responses of output, aggregate consumption and aggregate hours
worked closely, we can find slight differences. The higher LTV ratio, the higher the
volatility. However, these differences are not big enough to conclude that LTV ratio
significantly changes effects of monetary policy.
These results have the implication that the level of household debt does not affect
the magnitude and transmission of monetary policy effects significantly because higher
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Figure 4.10: Aggregate responses to monetary policy shock (25bp ↑)
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate, inflation and debt to output are expressed
as percent deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate, inflation and
debt to output are percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: Model 1, Dotted lines:
Model 2.
LTV ratios can be regarded as a proxy of higher level of household debt. If we interpret
different LTV ratios as different macroprudential policy regimes, these results can imply
that macroprudential policy regime does not influence monetary policy significantly.
Monetary policy shock with different amortisation rates
Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 plot responses to a monetary policy shock (25bp increase
in annual policy rate) under three different amortisation rates; 0.001, 0.007 and 0.014.
This experiment also designed to see the relationship between monetary policy and
macroprudential policy regime. Once again we can see that monetary policy does not
seem to be significantly influenced by amortisation rate (macroprudential regime). So,
this result does not seem to be different from that in the previous experiment with
different LTV ratios.
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Figure 4.11: Household responses to monetary policy shock with different LTV ratios
0 5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
B's Housing Stock
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
1
S's Housing Stock
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
B's Nondurable Cons.
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
S's Nondurable Cons.
0 5 10 15 20
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
B's Hours Worked
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
S's Hours Worked
0 5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
B's Wage
0 5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
S's Wage
0 5 10 15 20
-0.01
0
0.01
Cap. Rental Rate
Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: LTV ratio 0.623, Dotted lines: LTV ratio 0.75, Dashed lines: LTV ratio
0.45
Figure 4.12: Aggregate responses to monetary policy shock with different LTV ratios
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate, inflation and debt to output are expressed
as percent deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate, inflation and
debt to output are percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: LTV ratio 0.623, Dotted
lines: LTV ratio 0.75, Dashed lines: LTV ratio 0.45
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Figure 4.13: Household responses to monetary policy shock with different amortisation
rates
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Notes: 1. All variables except capital rental rate are expressed as percent deviation
from their initial steady-state values. Capital rental rate is percentage point deviation.
2. Solid lines: amortisation rate 0.001, Dotted lines: amortisation rate 0.007, Dashed
lines: amortisation rate 0.014
Figure 4.14: Aggregate responses to monetary policy shock with different amortisation
rates
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Notes: 1. All variables except interest rate, inflation and debt to output are expressed
as percent deviation from their initial steady-state values. Interest rate, inflation and
debt to output are percentage point deviation. 2. Solid lines: amortisation rate 0.001,
Dotted lines: amortisation rate 0.007, Dashed lines: amortisation rate 0.014
4.6 Conclusions
As household debt level in South Korea continues to grow, policymakers in South Korea
have kept on eye on the level of household debt for more than ten years since mid-2000s
and are trying to slow down the speed of its growth. This chapter tries to incorporate
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both borrowing and household debt in a medium scale DSGE model with a proper
collateral constraint in order to provide a proper policy analysis tool to address house-
hold debt issue. Results have at least three implications. First, only macroprudential
policies such as lowering LTV ratio and increasing amortisation rate are effective in
slowing down the speed of household debt growth. Tightening monetary policy even
increases household debt level in this model economy. Among credit tightening mea-
sures, increase in amortisation rate is more effective than lowering LTV ratio as in
the previous chapter because it makes less volatility in the economy. Second, different
macroprudential regimes such as different LTV ratios and different amortisation rates
do not change the magnitude and transmission of monetary policy effects. It also can
be said that monetary policy is not significantly affected by the level of household debt.
Third, as in the previous chapter, effects of house price change rely on its source of
change. If house price is changed by housing demand, in other words, the source of
change in house price is independent from other macroeconomic variables, its effects
could be relatively limited.
These implications can be interpreted from the perspective of policymakers. When
the government tries to address household debt problem with minimum disturbance
in macroeconomy, raising amortisation rate could be the most effective than any other
policies. When monetary policy authority makes a decision, the level of household debt
may not be a critical factor to consider at least in that it does not change effects of
monetary policy.
Appendix
4.A Equilibrium
The model has a unique stationary equilibrium in which impatient household borrows
up to the borrowing limit. The equilibrium conditions are as follows.
[1] λb,t =
1
Cb,t − hCb,t−1 − hβbEt
1
Cb,t+1 − hCb,t
This can be rewritten as U ′(Cb,t) = λb,t.
[2] qt(1− µb,tθt) = βbEt
[
λb,t+1
λb,t
{
φt+1
λb,t+1Hb,t+1
+ (1− δh)qt+1(1− µb,t+1θt+1)
}]
[3] Lηb,t = λb,twb,t
This can be rewritten as −U
′(Lb,t)
U ′(Cb,t)
= wb,t.
[4] λb,t(1− µb,t) = βbEtλb,t+1
pit+1
{
Rt − (1− %t)µb,t+1
}
This is different from the standard consumption Euler equation because impatient
households has a borrowing constraint. This can be rewritten as
U ′(Cb,t)(1− µb,t) = βbEtU
′(Cb,t+1)
pit+1
{
Rt − (1− %t)µb,t+1
}
. If there is no borrowing constraint (µb,t = µb,t+1 = 0), this reduces to the standard
consumption Euler equation.
[5] Cb,t + qtNb,t +Rt−1
db,t
pit
= wb,tLb,t − Tb,t + db,t+1
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[6] db,t+1 = (1− %t−1)db,t
pit
+ θtqtNb,t
[7] Nb,t = Hb,t+1 − (1− δh)Hb,t
[8] λs,t =
1
Cs,t − hCs,t−1 − hβsEt
1
Cs,t+1 − hCs,t
This can be rewritten as U ′(Cs,t) = λs,t.
[9] qt = βsEt
[
λs,t+1
λs,t
{
φt+1
λs,t+1Hs,t+1
+ (1− δh)qt+1
}]
[10] Lηs,t = λs,tws,t
This can be rewritten as −U
′(Ls,t)
U ′(Cs,t)
= ws,t.
[11] λs,t = βsRtEt
λs,t+1
pit+1
This is the standard consumption Euler equation for the patient household and can
be rewritten as:
U ′(Cs,t) = βsRtEt
U ′(Cs,t+1)
pit+1
[12] µs,t = βsEt
λs,t+1
λs,t
{rk,t+1 + (1− δk)µs,t+1}
[13] Ns,t = Hs,t+1 − (1− δh)Hs,t
[14] Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + Ft(It, It−1)
[15] Ft(It, It−1) = AI,t
{
1− ζk 12
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2}
It
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1 = µs,tAI,t
[
1− ζk 12
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− ζk
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
]
[16]
+ βsEtAI,t+1
λs,t+1
λs,t
µs,t+1ζk
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
[17] νpt = ξp
(pit−1
pit
)−ε
νpt−1 + (1− ξp)pi∗t −ε
where νpt =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
di.
[18] Yt =
A1−αt Kαt
[
{ψLb,t}ν{(1− ψ)Ls,t}1−ν
]1−α − AtΓ
νpt
[19] mctν(1− α)(νpt Yt + AtΓ)L−1b,t = ψwb,t
[20] mct(1− ν)(1− α)(νpt Yt + AtΓ)L−1s,t = (1− ψ)ws,t
[21] mct =
( 1
1− α
)1−α( 1
α
)α( 1
At
)1−α
rαk,t
[(1
ν
wb,t
)ν( 1
1− νws,t
)1−ν]1−α
[22] pi∗tMt = Zt
[23] Zt =
ε
ε− 1λs,tmctYt + βsξpEt
(
pit
pit+1
)1−ε
Zt+1
[24] Mt = λs,tYt + βsξpEt
(
pit
pit+1
)−ε
Mt+1
[25] 1 = ξp
(pit−1
pit
)1−ε
+ (1− ξp)pi∗t 1−ε
1 = qtAH,t
{
1− ζh12
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)2
− ζh
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)}
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
[26]
+ βsEtAH,t+1
λs,t+1
λs,t
qt+1ζh
(
Ih,t+1
Ih,t
− 1
)(
Ih,t+1
Ih,t
)2
[27] Nt = AH,t
{
1− ζh12
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− 1
)2}
Ih,t
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[28] ψTb,t = γgYt
[29] Gt = (1− ψ)Ts,t + ψTb,t
[30] Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ωR[(pit
pi
)ωpi(Yt
Y
)ωY ]1−ωR
ξr,t
[31] ψdb,t+1 + (1− ψ)ds,t+1 = 0
[32] Nt = (1− ψ)Ns,t + ψNb,t
[33] Ct = (1− ψ)Cs,t + ψCb,t
[34] Lt = (1− ψ)Ls,t + ψLb,t
[35] Yt = Ct + Ih,t + It +Gt
[36] lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + εa,t, εa,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σa2)
[37] ln %t = ρ% ln %t−1 + (1− ρ%) ln %+ ε%,t, ε%,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ%2)
[38] ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + (1− ρθ) ln θ − εθ,t, εθ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σθ2)
[39] lnφt = ρφ lnφt−1 + (1− ρφ) lnφ− εφ,t, εφ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σφ2)
[40] lnGt = ρG lnGt−1 + (1− ρG) lnG+ εG,t, εG,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σG2)
[41] lnAI,t = ρI lnAI,t−1 + εI,t, εI,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σI2)
[42] lnAH,t = ρH lnAH,t−1 + εH,t, εH,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σH2)
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4.B Steady State
The model can be solved when θ, φ and ξr are regarded as parameters. We abstract
from growth (A = 1).
q = µs = pi∗ = νp = 1 R =
pi
βs
µb =
pi
(
1− βb
βs
)
pi − βb(1− %) rk =
1
βs
− (1− δk)
aux1 =
βbφ(1− h)
(1− µbθ)[1− (1− δh)βb](1− βbh)
aux2 =
βsφ(1− h)
[1− (1− δh)βs](1− βsh)
aux3 =
rk
ψα
{ν(1− α)− γg}
1 + aux1δh
[
1 + θq1−(1−%) 1
pi
(R
pi
− 1)
]
aux4 =
rk
α
(1− g)− δk − ψaux3(1 + δhaux1)
(1− ψ)(1 + δhaux2)
Lb =
[(1− hβb)ν(1− α)rk
αψaux3(1− h)
] 1
η+1
Ls =
[(1− hβs)(1− ν)(1− α)rk
α(1− ψ)aux4(1− h)
] 1
η+1
mc = ε− 1
ε
K =
(
mcα
rk
) 1
1−α{ψLb}ν{(1− ψ)Ls}1−ν
Y = rkK
α
Cb = aux3K
Cs = aux4K λb =
1− hβb
Cb(1− h)
λs =
1− hβs
Cs(1− h) Hb = aux1Cb
Hs = aux2Cs Nb = δhHb
Ns = δhHs N = (1− ψ)Ns + ψNb
Ih = N L = (1− ψ)Ls + ψLb
db =
θqNb
1− (1− %) 1
pi
ds =
ψ
ψ − 1db
C = (1− ψ)Cs + ψCb F = δkK
I = F Γ = Y
ε− 1
wb =
ν(1− α)Y
ψLb
ws =
(1− ν)(1− α)Y
(1− ψ)Lb
M = λsY1− βsξp Z =
λsY
1− βsξp
Tb =
γgY
ψ
G = gY
Ts =
G− ψTb
1− ψ
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The steady state can be briefly described as follows.
C
Y
= α[ψaux3 + (1− ψ)aux4]
δk − 1 + 1βs
Ih + I
Y
= αδk[(1− ψ)aux1aux3 + ψaux2aux4] + αδk
δk − 1 + 1βs
N
Y
= αδk[ψaux1aux3 + (1− ψ)aux2aux4]
δk − 1 + 1βs
H
Y
= α[ψaux1aux3 + (1− ψ)aux2aux4]
δk − 1 + 1βs
Db
Y
= αθPhδhaux1aux3
%(δk − 1 + 1βs )
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4.C Log-linearized Equations
[1] λˆb,t =
−1
(1− h)(1− hβb){Cˆb,t − hCˆb,t−1 − hβbEt(Cˆb,t+1 − hCˆb,t)}
qˆt =
µbθ(µˆb,t + θˆt)
1− µbθ + Et(φˆt+1 − λˆb,t − Hˆb,t+1)[2]
− βb(1− δh)Et
[
φˆt+1 − λˆb,t+1 − Hˆb,t+1 − qˆt+1 + µbθ(µˆb,t+1 + θˆt+1)1− µbθ
]
[3] wˆb,t = Cˆb,t + ηLˆb,t
λˆb,t =
µb,t
1− µb µˆb,t +
R
R− (1− %)µbEt(λˆb,t+1 + Rˆt − pˆit+1)[4]
− (1− %)µb
R− (1− %)µb (λˆb,t+1 − pˆit+1 + µˆb,t+1 −
%
1− %%ˆt)
[5] CbCˆb,t +Nb(qˆt + Nˆb,t) +
Rdb
pi
(Rˆt−1 + dˆb,t− pˆit) = wbLb(wˆb,t + Lˆb,t)−TbTˆb,t + dbdˆb,t+1
[6] dˆb,t+1 =
1− %
pi
(dˆb,t − pˆit)− %
pi
%ˆt−1 +
θNb
db
(θˆt + qˆt + Nˆb,t)
[7] Nˆb,t =
1
δh
Hˆb,t+1 − 1− δh
δh
Hˆb,t
[8] λˆs,t =
−1
(1− h)(1− hβs){Cˆs,t − hCˆs,t−1 − hβsEt(Cˆs,t+1 − hCˆs,t)}
[9] qˆt = Et(φˆt+1 − λˆs,t − Hˆs,t+1)− βs(1− δh)Et(φˆt+1 − λˆs,t+1 − Hˆs,t+1 − qˆt+1)
[10] wˆs,t = Cˆs,t + ηLˆs,t
[11] λˆs,t =
βsR
pi
Et(Rˆt + λˆs,t+1 − pˆit+1)
[12] µˆs,t = Et(λˆs,t+1 − λˆs,t + rˆk,t+1)− βs(1− δk)Et(rˆk,t+1 − µˆs,t+1)
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[13] Nˆs,t =
1
δh
Hˆs,t+1 − 1− δh
δh
Hˆs,t
[14] Kˆt+1 = (1− δk)Kˆt + F
K
Fˆt
[15] Fˆt = Iˆt + AˆI,t
[16] µˆs,t + AˆI,t = ζk(Iˆt − Iˆt−1)− βsζkEt(Iˆt+1 − Iˆt)
[17] νˆpt = ξp
{
ε(pˆit − pˆit−1) + νˆpt−1
}
+ (1− ξp)εpˆi∗t
[18] Y ν
p(Yˆt + νˆpt )
Y νp + AΓ =
(
1− α− AΓ
Y νp + AΓ
)
Aˆt + αKˆt + (1− α){νLˆb,t + (1− ν)Lˆs,t}
[19] wˆb,t =
νpY (mˆct − Lˆb,t + νˆpt + Yˆt) + AΓ(mˆct − Lˆb,t + Aˆt)
νpY + AΓ
[20] wˆs,t =
νpY (mˆct − Lˆs,t + νˆpt + Yˆt) + AΓ(mˆct − Lˆs,t + Aˆt)
νpY + AΓ
[21] mˆct = −(1− α)Aˆt + αrˆk,t + (1− α){νwˆb,t + (1− ν)wˆs,t}
[22] pˆi∗t + Mˆt = Zˆt
[23] Zˆt = (1− βsξp)(λˆs,t + mˆct + Yˆt) + βsξpEt
{
(1− ε)(pˆit − pˆit+1) + Zˆt+1
}
[24] Mˆt = (1− βsξp)(λˆs,t + Yˆt) + βsξpEt
{
ε(pˆit+1 − pˆit) + Mˆt+1
}
[25] pˆi∗t =
ξp
(1− ξp)pi∗1−ε (pˆit − pˆit−1)
[26] qˆt + AˆH,t = ζh(Iˆh,t − Iˆh,t−1)− βsζhEt(Iˆh,t+1 − Iˆh,t)
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[27] Nˆt = Iˆh,t + AˆH,t
[28] Tˆb,t = Yˆt
[29] Gˆt =
1
G
[(1− ψ)TsTˆs,t + ψTbTˆb,t]
[30] Rˆt = ωRRˆt−1 + (1− ωR)(ωpipˆit + ωY Yˆt) + ξr,t
[31] dˆs,t+1 = −dˆb,t+1
[32] Nˆt =
1
N
[(1− ψ)NsNˆs,t + ψNbNˆb,t]
[33] Cˆt =
1
C
[(1− ψ)CsCˆs,t + ψCbCˆb,t]
[34] Lˆt =
1
L
[(1− ψ)LsLˆs,t + ψLbLˆb,t]
[35] Yˆt = Cˆt + Iˆh,t + Iˆt + Gˆt
[36] Aˆt = ρaAˆt−1 + εa,t
[37] %ˆt = ρ%%ˆt−1 + ε%,t
[38] θˆt = ρθθˆt−1 − εθ,t
[39] φˆt = ρφφˆt−1 − εφ,t
[40] Gˆt = ρGGˆt−1 + εG,t
[41] AˆI,t = ρIAˆI,t−1 + εI,t
[42] AˆH,t = ρHAˆH,t−1 + εH,t
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4.D Priors and Posteriors of Estimated Parameters
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4.E Dynare Code
@#define bc=0
// if bc=0 Model 1
// if bc=1 Model 2
var
LAMBDAB // Lagrangian multiplier on borrower budget constraint
LAMBDAS // Lagrangian multiplier on saver budget constraint
CB // Consumption of borrower
CS // Consumption of saver
C // Aggregate Consumption
THETA // LTV ratio
PHI // Housing preference
Q // House price
HB // Housing stock of borrower
HS // Housing stock of saver
WB // Wage of borrower
WS // Wage of saver
LB // Labour supply of borrower
LS // Labour supply of saver
L // Aggregate Labour supply
MUB // Lagrangian multiplier on borrower borrowing constraint
MUS // Lagrangian multiplier on saver capital accumulation
R // Nominal gross interest rate
AMO // Amortisation rate
DB // Debt of borrower
DS // Debt of saver
NB // Housing investment of borrower
NS // Housing investment of saver
N // Aggregate Housing investment
RK // Capital rental rate
K // Capital stock
IK // Capital investment
F // Investment adjustment cost
Y // Output
IH // Housing investment
PI // Inflation
VP // VP
PS // PI^*
MC // Marginal cost
M // M
Z // Z
TB // Tax for borrower
TS // Tax for saver
G // Government spending
AT // AR(1) technology process
IKS // AR(1) capital investment-specific technology process
IHS // AR(1) housing investment-specific technology process
;
var
Lobs Cobs Piobs Robs Ihobs Ikobs Qobs Yobs;
varexo
EPS_AT // technology shock
EPS_AMO // amortisation rate shock
EPS_THETA // LTV ratio shock
EPS_PHI // housing preference shock
EPS_G // fiscal shock
EPS_MS // monetary policy shock
EPS_IK // capital investment-specific technology shock
EPS_IH // housing investment-specific technology shock
;
parameters
alppha // capital share
niu // wage share of borrower
bettab // discount factor of borrower
bettas // discount factor of saver
eta // inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
deltak // capital depreciation rate
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deltah // housing depreciation rate
psi // population share of borrower
zetak // capital investment adjustment cost parameter
zetah // adjustment cost parameter in house production
epsil // epsilon
xip // xip
sharetb // tax share of borrower
shareg // government spending share in output
or // degree of smoothing in monetary policy
op // policy weight on inflation
oy // policy weight on output
rhoat // autocorrelation technology shock
rhoamo // autocorrelation amortisatino shock
rhotheta // autocorrelation LTV shock
rhophi // autocorrelation housing preference shock
rhog // autocorrelation fiscal shock
hf // habit formation
rhoik // autocorrelation fiscal shock
rhoih // autocorrelation fiscal shock
PHIss PIss ATss Qss MUSss Rss PSss VPss THETAss AMOss //steady state values
;
bettas=.998;
bettab=.995;
eta=1;
psi=.657;
alppha=.3;
deltak=.025;
deltah=.005;
zetak=0.2;
zetah=1.3;
niu=.82;
rhoat=.95;
rhoamo=.85;
rhotheta=.85;
rhophi=.85;
rhoik=.85;
rhoih=.85;
or=.7;
op=3.0;
oy=.5;
xip=.62;
epsil=7.67;
rhog=.85;
shareg=.142;
sharetb=.55;
hf=0.42;
// steady state
AMOss=0.001;
PHIss=.12;
PIss=1.006;
ATss=1;
Qss=1;
MUSss=1;
Rss=PIss/bettas;
PSss=1;
VPss=1;
THETAss=0.65;
MSss=0;
model(linear);
%%%%%%% STEADY STATE RELATIONSHIPS %%%%%%%
@#if bc==0
#MUBss=PIss*(1-bettab/bettas)/(PIss-bettab*(1-AMOss));
@#else
#MUBss=1-bettab/bettas;
@#endif
#RKss=1/bettas-(1-deltak);
@#if bc==0
#AUX1=(bettab*PHIss)*(1-hf)/((1-MUBss*THETAss)*(1-(1-deltah)*bettab)*
(1-bettab*hf));
@#else
#AUX1=(bettab*PHIss)*(1-hf)/((1-MUBss*THETAss)-(1-deltah)*bettab*(1-bettab*hf))/;
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@#endif
#AUX2=(bettas*PHIss)*(1-hf)/((1-(1-deltah)*bettas)*(1-bettas*hf));
@#if bc==0
#AUX3=((RKss*(niu*(1-alppha)-sharetb*shareg))/(psi*alppha))/(1+AUX1*deltah
*(1+((THETAss*Qss)/(1-(1-AMOss)/PIss))*(Rss/PIss-1)));
@#else
#AUX3=((RKss*(niu*(1-alppha)-sharetb*shareg))/(psi*alppha))/(1+AUX1*Qss*(THETAss
*(Rss/PIss-1)+deltah));
@#endif
#AUX4=(RKss*(1-shareg)/alppha-deltak-psi*AUX3*(1+deltah*AUX1))/((1-psi)
*(1+deltah*AUX2));
#LBss=(((1-hf*bettab)*niu*(1-alppha)*RKss)/(alppha*psi*AUX3*(1-hf)))^(1/(eta+1));
#LSss=(((1-hf*bettas)*(1-niu)*(1-alppha)*RKss)/(alppha*(1-psi)*AUX4*(1-hf)))
^(1/(eta+1));
#MCss=(epsil-1)/epsil;
#Kss=(MCss*alppha/RKss)^(1/(1-alppha))*(psi*LBss)^niu*((1-psi)*LSss)^(1-niu);
#Yss=(RKss*Kss)/alppha;
#CBss=AUX3*Kss;
#CSss=AUX4*Kss;
#LAMBDABss=(1-bettab*hf)/(CBss*(1-hf));
#LAMBDASss=(1-bettas*hf)/(CSss*(1-hf));
#HBss=AUX1*CBss;
#HSss=AUX2*CSss;
#NBss=deltah*HBss;
#NSss=deltah*HSss;
#Nss=(1-psi)*NSss+psi*NBss;
#IHss=Nss;
@#if bc==0
#DBss=(THETAss*Qss*NBss)/(1-(1-AMOss)/PIss);
@#else
#DBss=THETAss*Qss*HBss;
@#endif
#DSss=(psi/(psi-1))*DBss;
#Css=(1-psi)*CSss+psi*CBss;
#Lss=(1-psi)*LSss+psi*LBss;
#Fss=deltak*Kss;
#IKss=Fss;
#FCss=Yss/(epsil-1);
#WBss=(niu*(1-alppha)*Yss)/(psi*LBss);
#WSss=((1-niu)*(1-alppha)*Yss)/((1-psi)*LSss);
#Mss=LAMBDASss*Yss/(1-bettas*xip);
#Zss=LAMBDASss*Yss/(1-bettas*xip);
#TBss=sharetb*shareg*Yss/psi;
#Gss=shareg*Yss;
#TSss=(Gss-psi*TBss)/(1-psi);
%%%%%%% MODEL %%%%%%%
LAMBDAB=(-1/((1-hf)*(1-hf*bettab)))*(CB-hf*CB(-1)-hf*bettab*(CB(+1)-hf*CB));
@#if bc==0
Q=MUBss*THETAss*(MUB+THETA)/(1-MUBss*THETAss)+(PHI(+1)-LAMBDAB-HB)-bettab*(1-deltah)
*(PHI(+1)-LAMBDAB(+1)-HB-Q(+1)+MUBss*THETAss*(MUB(+1)+THETA(+1))/(1-MUBss*THETAss));
@#else
Q*(1-MUB*THETA)=bettab*(LAMBDAB(+1)/LAMBDAB)*(PHI(+1)/(LAMBDAB(+1)*HB)+(1-deltah)
*Q(+1));
@#endif
eta*LB=WB+LAMBDAB;
@#if bc==0
LAMBDAB=MUBss*MUB/(1-MUBss)+(Rss/(Rss-(1-AMOss)*MUBss))*(LAMBDAB(+1)+R-PI(+1))
-(((1-AMOss)*MUBss)/(Rss-(1-AMOss)*MUBss))*(LAMBDAB(+1)-PI(+1)+MUB(+1)-AMOss
*AMO/(1-AMOss));
@#else
LAMBDAB*(1-MUB)=bettab*LAMBDAB(+1)*R/PI(+1);
@#endif
CBss*CB+NBss*(Q+NB)+(Rss*DBss/PIss)*(R(-1)+DB(-1)-PI)=WBss*LBss*(WB+LB)-TBss*TB
+DBss*DB;
@#if bc==0
DB=((1-AMOss)/PIss)*(DB(-1)-PI)-(AMOss/PIss)*AMO(-1)+(THETAss*NBss/DBss)
*(THETA+Q+NB);
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@#else
DB=THETA*Q*HB;
@#endif
NB=HB/deltah-HB(-1)*(1-deltah)/deltah;
LAMBDAS=(-1/((1-hf)*(1-hf*bettas)))*(CS-hf*CS(-1)-hf*bettas*(CS(+1)-hf*CS));
Q=PHI(+1)-LAMBDAS-HS - bettas*(1-deltah)*(PHI(+1)-LAMBDAS(+1)-HS-Q(+1));
eta*LS=WS+LAMBDAS;
LAMBDAS=(bettas*Rss/PIss)*(R+LAMBDAS(+1)-PI(+1));
MUS=LAMBDAS(+1)-LAMBDAS+RK(+1)-bettas*(1-deltak)*(RK(+1)-MUS(+1));
NS=HS/deltah-HS(-1)*(1-deltah)/deltah;
K=(1-deltak)*K(-1)+Fss*F/Kss;
F=IK+IKS;
MUS+IKS =zetak*(IK-IK(-1))-bettas*zetak*(IK(+1)-IK);
VP=xip*(epsil*(PI-PI(-1))+VP(-1))-(1-xip)*epsil*PS;
Yss*VPss*(Y+VP)/(Yss*VPss+ATss*FCss)=(1-alppha-ATss*FCss/(Yss*VPss+ATss*FCss))*AT
+alppha*K(-1)+(1-alppha)*(niu*LB+(1-niu)*LS);
WB=(VPss*Yss*(MC-LB+VP+Y)+ATss*FCss*(MC-LB+AT))/(VPss*Yss+ATss*FCss);
WS=(VPss*Yss*(MC-LS+VP+Y)+ATss*FCss*(MC-LS+AT))/(VPss*Yss+ATss*FCss);
MC=-(1-alppha)*AT+alppha*RK+(1-alppha)*(niu*WB+(1-niu)*WS);
PS+M=Z;
Z=(1-bettas*xip)*(LAMBDAS+MC+Y)+bettas*xip*((1-epsil)*(PI-PI(+1))+Z(+1));
M=(1-bettas*xip)*(LAMBDAS+Y)+bettas*xip*(epsil*(PI(+1)-PI)+M(+1));
PS=xip*(PI-PI(-1))/((1-xip)*PSss^(1-epsil));
Q+IHS=zetah*(IH-IH(-1))-bettas*zetah*(IH(+1)-IH);
N=IH+IHS;
TB=Y;
Gss*G=psi*TBss*TB+(1-psi)*TSss*TS;
R=or*R(-1)+(1-or)*(op*PI+oy*Y)+EPS_MS;
DB=DS;
Nss*N=(1-psi)*NSss*NS+psi*NBss*NB;
Css*C=(1-psi)*CSss*CS+psi*CBss*CB;
Lss*L=(1-psi)*LSss*LS+psi*LBss*LB;
Y*Yss=C*Css+IH*IHss+IK*IKss+G*Gss;
AT=rhoat*AT(-1)+EPS_AT;
AMO=rhoamo*AMO(-1)+EPS_AMO;
THETA=rhotheta*THETA(-1)-EPS_THETA;
PHI=rhophi*PHI(-1)-EPS_PHI;
G=rhog*G(-1)+EPS_G;
IKS=rhoik*IKS(-1)+EPS_IK;
IHS=rhoih*IHS(-1)+EPS_IH;
%%%%%%% Measurment equations %%%%%%%
Cobs=C;
Yobs=Y;
Ihobs=IH;
Ikobs=IK;
Piobs=PI;
Robs=R;
Qobs=Q;
Lobs=L;
end;
resid(1);
steady;
check;
%%%%%%% Bayesian Estimation and Simulation %%%%%%%
estimated_params;
stderr EPS_AT, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr EPS_G, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr EPS_MS, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr EPS_AMO, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr EPS_THETA, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr EPS_PHI, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr EPS_IK, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr EPS_IH, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 2.00;
stderr Qobs, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 1;
stderr Ihobs, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 1;
stderr Ikobs, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 1;
stderr Cobs, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 0.1;
stderr Lobs, INV_GAMMA_PDF,0.01, 0.1;
rhoat, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
rhog, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
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rhoamo, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
rhotheta, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
rhophi, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
rhoik, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
rhoih, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
zetak, GAMMA_PDF, 4.00, 1.50;
zetah, GAMMA_PDF, 4.00, 1.50;
hf, BETA_PDF, 0.50, 0.10;
xip, BETA_PDF, 0.75, 0.05;
alppha, BETA_PDF, 0.33, 0.01;
niu, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.01;
or, BETA_PDF, 0.80, 0.10;
oy, BETA_PDF, 0.20, 0.10;
op, NORMAL_PDF, 3.00, 0.20;
THETAss, BETA_PDF, 0.65, 0.05;
PHIss, NORMAL_PDF, 0.15, 0.02;
eta, GAMMA_PDF, 1.00, 0.20;
end;
%%%%%%% Declaration of observable variables %%%%%%%
varobs Lobs Cobs Piobs Robs Ihobs Ikobs Qobs Yobs;
options_.plot_priors=0;
estimation(datafile=kordata,mode_compute=4,prefilter=0,mh_replic=500000
,presample=4,mh_nblocks=2,mh_jscale=0.40,mh_drop=0.2,tex);
shock_decomposition (parameter_set=posterior_mode) Lobs Cobs Piobs Robs
Ihobs Ikobs Qobs Yobs;
options_.pruning=1;
stoch_simul(periods=1000,hp_filter=1600, order = 2,irf=100);
Chapter 5
Welfare Effects of Macroprudential
Policy in South Korea
5.1 Introduction
The recent experience of the US Great Recession and fast growing household debt made
South Korean government pay more attention to preventing financial instability by
using macroprudential policy. As it is widely suggested that borrowers with collateral
constraint lost more of their welfare than savers by the US Great Recession (Hur, 2016;
Menno and Oliviero, 2016), pre-emptive macroprudential policies such as lowering LTV
ratio and increasing amortisation rate may not equally affect the welfare of borrower
and saver. If borrowers and savers are not equally affected by macroprudential policy,
policymakers should estimate how and how much they are affected differently before
conducting macroprudential policy and understand its distributional effects between
households. However, it is not easy to quantify welfare effects of macroprudential
policy because its transmission mechanism has not been clearly analysed on the basis
of general equilibrium models and findings by some literature do not conform with our
intuition. For example, Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) show increasing LTV ratio
and lowering amortisation rate could worsen borrower’s welfare while saver’s welfare
always improves, which is opposite to our intuition. Furthermore, once welfare effects
are estimated, it needs to be checked whether there is room for Pareto-improving policy.
Although some literature (Lambertini et al., 2013; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014)
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find room for social welfare gains or Pareto-superior outcomes by adopting optimal
macroprudential policy rule, it still needs to be checked if the same results can be
obtained for the South Korean economy.
Firstly, effects of discretionary countercyclical macroprudential policy are anal-
ysed. In South Korea, macroprudential policy has been conducted by government in
discretionary way rather than in rule-based way as in many other countries. Thus,
estimating effects of discretionary policy is more crucial and practical than finding
optimal macroprudential rule. Results suggest that social welfare cannot help but de-
crease by discretionary credit tightening policy with given parameter values in South
Korea. Only borrower can get welfare gain. Thus, Pareto-improving credit tightening
is not possible. However, it is also found that credit loosening policy, which can be
conducted when the financial conditions need to be improved, can increase social wel-
fare considerably. Increasing amortisation rate could be better in credit tightening and
increasing LTV ratio could be better in credit loosening. Next, optimal countercyclical
macroprudential rules are found when there is only LTV ratio rule, when there is only
amortisation rate rule and when there is a mixture of two rules. Results suggest that
the most effective rule is the mixture of LTV ratio and amortisation rate rules.
The rest of this chapter is structural as follows. Section 5.2 introduces key liter-
ature. Section 5.3 explains the welfare measures used for analysis. Section 5.4 checks
necessary conditions for welfare gains by discretionary macroprudential policy. Welfare
effects of discretionary macroprudential policy are estimated in section 5.5. Optimal
macroprudential rule is shown in section 5.6. Finally, conclusion is presented in section
5.7.
5.2 Literature Review
Since Kim and Kim (2003) show that welfare analysis cannot be performed correctly by
the first-order approximation, many studies perform welfare analysis by using the pro-
posed second-order approximation. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) derive a practical
solution method for the second-order approximation to the policy function of dynamic
models. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) use the same second-order approximation
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to find out optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules which maximise welfare. In es-
timating welfare measures, this chapter follows Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). As
Chen and Columba (2016) explain, model’s equilibrium conditions are obtained by the
second-order approximation and then welfare measures are estimated by simulating
the model. The estimated parameter values in chapter 4 are used in this work.
Welfare effects of discretionary demand-side macroprudential policy in borrower-
saver model are first documented by Campbell and Hercowitz (2009). Campbell and
Hercowitz (2009) find that relaxing borrower’s collateral constraint makes borrower’s
welfare fall by the dominant indirect effects of endogenous interest rate and other
relative price changes despite of positive direct effect of credit loosening. Although
this result is counter-intuitive, following research such as Chen and Columba (2016)
and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) also shows the similar results. In contrast,
Mendicino et al. (2012) find that higher LTV ratio increases social welfare and lower
LTV ratio decreases social welfare.
There are recent studies that find optimal demand-side macroprudential rule.
Lambertini et al. (2013) shows optimal countercyclical LTV ratio rule against credit
growth can improve social welfare. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) also find the
optimal parameter value of the LTV ratio rule which can improve social welfare.
5.3 Welfare Measure
As pointed out in Kim and Kim (2003), a second-order approximation has to be used
solving the model in order to get correct results for welfare analysis. As in Rubio and
Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), the welfare of two types
of households as well as social welfare is evaluated using a second-order approximation.
The welfare for borrower and saver are as follows:
Wb,t = E0
∞∑
j=0
βjbUb,t+j (5.3.1)
Ws,t = E0
∞∑
j=0
βjsUs,t+j (5.3.2)
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where
Ub,t+j = ln (Cb,t+j − hCb,t+j−1) + φt+j lnHb,t+j−1 −
L1+ηb,t+j
1 + η (5.3.3)
Us,t+j = ln (Cs,t+j − hCs,t+j−1) + φt+j lnHs,t+j−1 −
L1+ηs,t+j
1 + η (5.3.4)
Equation 5.3.1 and Equation 5.3.2 can be written recursively as follows.
Wb,t = Ub,t + βbWb,t+1 (5.3.5)
Ws,t = Us,t + βsWs,t+1 (5.3.6)
The value of welfare is based on the utility function which is not cardinal. To
make this value intuitive, it needs to be converted in consumption equivalent unit as in
Ascari and Ropele (2012). Specifically the difference between new steady-state welfare
and old steady-state welfare is converted as follows.
W oldb =
1
βb
[
ln {(1− h)Coldb }+ φold lnHoldb −
Loldb
1+η
1 + η
]
W olds =
1
βs
[
ln {(1− h)Colds }+ φold lnHolds −
Lolds
1+η
1 + η
]
where superscript old means value in the initial steady-state. If the welfare in new
steady-state is higher than in initial steady-state, households should consume more
of the constant fraction of non-durable good consumption in initial steady-state, CEb
and CEs, respectively, in order to obtain the level of welfare in new steady-state. So
positive values of CEb and CEs mean welfare gains from initial steady-state to new
steady-state.1 The welfare in new steady-state can be written as
W newb =
1
βb
[
ln {(1− h)(1 + CEb)Coldb }+ φold lnHoldb −
Loldb
1+η
1 + η
]
W news =
1
βs
[
ln {(1− h)(1 + CEs)Colds }+ φold lnHolds −
Lolds
1+η
1 + η
]
Then, we get
CEb = exp[(1− βb)(W newb −W oldb )]− 1 (5.3.7)
CEs = exp[(1− βs)(W news −W olds )]− 1 (5.3.8)
1 Thus, welfare analysis in this chapter is limited to welfare at steady-state.
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As we define, CEb and CEs indicate the fraction of each household’s own con-
sumption in initial steady state. Thus, if we convert the sum of CEb and CEs to the
fraction of aggregate consumption in old steady state, we get aggregate (social) welfare
gains, CE, as follows.
(1 + CE)Cold = ψ(1 + CEb)Coldb + (1− ψ)(1 + CEs)Colds
CE = ψCEbC
old
b + (1− ψ)CEsColds
Cold
(5.3.9)
where aggregate consumption is a population weighted sum of each household’s con-
sumption as we define in the previous chapters. We can interpret CE as aggregate
(social) welfare gains in terms of aggregate non-durable good consumption equivalent.2
5.4 Necessary Conditions for Welfare Gains by Dis-
cretionary Macroprudential Policy
Although recent literature on macroprudential policy try to find an optimal rule under
some assumptions, macroprudential policy in South Korea is not performed by rules but
by government’s discretion. However, their welfare effects have not been analysed based
on general equilibrium models. In this section, possibility and necessary conditions for
welfare gains by discretionary macroprudential policies are shown.
Figure 5.1 illustrates welfare gains along with decremental LTV ratios in con-
sumption equivalent units. When LTV ratio decreases, saver’s welfare gain is always
negative and borrower’s welfare gain is always positive. Social welfare gains start from
positive and turn into negative when LTV ratio reaches around 0.72. Therefore, only
when the initial LTV ratio is higher than 0.72, pre-emptive macroprudential policy of
lowering LTV ratio can attain social welfare gains. If the initial LTV ratio is 0.626
as calibrated in chapter 4, there is no room for social welfare gains or Pareto-superior
outcomes by lowering LTV ratio and only borrower can get welfare gain.
2Social welfare is usually defined as a weighted sum of each household’s welfare (Pescatori, Men-
dicino, et al., 2005; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014). However, as Mendicino et al. (2015) point
out, there is no commonly accepted weights assigned to each household. Using aggregate consumption
equivalent CE as social welfare gains is in line with a definition of aggregate consumption in the model
and does not require any additional assumption for social welfare gains.
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Figure 5.1: Welfare gains by decreasing LTV ratio
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Notes: 1. LTV ratio decreases by 0.1 starting from 0.85. 2. Welfare gain (loss)
= welfare with the new LTV ratio − welfare with the previous LTV ratio. 3. Solid
lines: Social welfare gains, Dotted lines: Borrower’s welfare gain, Dashed lines: Saver’s
welfare gain
Furthermore, an additional experiment is performed to check robustness of bor-
rower’s welfare gain when LTV ratio lowers. By lowering borrower’s discount factor
βb starting from the calibrated value 0.995 while the value of βs is fixed at 0.998, bor-
rower’s welfare gains are estimated when LTV ratio decreases.3 Because the result
contradicts our intuition that tightening credit conditions reduces borrower’s welfare
as Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) mention. As we see in Figure 5.2 borrower’s wel-
fare gains are not always positive when LTV ratio decreases. If βb is less than 0.993,
borrower’s welfare gain could be negative when LTV ratio reduces. So, the value of
βb seems to affect the dynamics of borrower’s welfare gain. However, even when βb
is below 0.990, for example, 0.975, borrower’s welfare gain can be always positive if
the value of βs is low enough, for example, 0.985. Therefore, it can be said that the
dynamics of borrower’s welfare gain rely on the gap between βb and βs rather than the
value of βb. When the gap is narrow enough, borrower’s welfare gain is always positive
when LTV ratio lowers as in Figure 5.1. When the gap is too wide, borrower’s welfare
gain may turn to be negative when LTV ratio lowers.
3Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) conclude welfare effects in their analysis do not rely on the value
of βb but their conclusion is based on results from just two alternative values.
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This result has two implications. One is that when real interest rate is very low,
which means βs is very high, but βb is very low, credit tightening may harm borrower’s
welfare much more than in any other times. On the contrary, credit loosening at that
time can benefit borrower more than in any other times. The other implication is that
when real interest rate is relatively high, which means low βs, but βb is very high,
pre-emptive macroprudential policy such as lowering LTV ratio can improve at least
borrower’s welfare. The best timing of pre-emptive macroprudential policy in terms of
minimum social welfare loss could be when the discount rate gap between two types of
household is the lowest.
Figure 5.2: Borrower’s welfare gains by decreasing LTV ratio with different discount
factors
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Notes: 1. LTV ratio decreases by 0.1 starting from 0.85. 2. Welfare gain (loss) =
welfare with the new LTV ratio − welfare with the previous LTV ratio.
When amortisation rate increases, it is also impossible to get social welfare gains as
shown in Figure 5.3. Only borrower can get welfare gain. As we expect, the dynamics
of borrower’s welfare gain rely on βb as shown in Figure 5.4. If βb is less than 0.975,
borrower’s welfare gain is always negative when amortisation rate rises. More precisely
speaking, the dynamics of borrower’s welfare gain depends on the gap between βb and
βs as in LTV ratio case. Even when βb is 0.970, borrower’s welfare gain can be always
positive if the value of βs is low enough, for example, 0.985.
Given the calibrated values of βb, βs and %, and estimated value of θ in chapter 4,
we cannot attain social welfare gains but can attain only borrower’s welfare gain when
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Figure 5.3: Welfare gains by increasing amortisation rate
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Notes: 1. Amortisation rate increases by 0.001 starting from 0.001. 2. Welfare
gain (loss) = welfare with the new amortisation rate − welfare with the previous
amortisation rate. 3. Solid lines: Social welfare gains, Dotted lines: Borrower’s welfare
gain, Dashed lines: Saver’s welfare gain
Figure 5.4: Borrower’s welfare gains by increasing amortisation rate with different
discount factors
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Notes: 1. Amortisation rate increases by 0.001 starting from 0.001. 2. Welfare
gain (loss) = welfare with the new amortisation rate − welfare with the previous
amortisation rate.
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LTV ratio lowers to less than 0.626 or amortisation rate increase to higher than 0.001.
Therefore, what we can do is finding a measure which can minimise social welfare loss
when macroprudential policy is based on policymakers’ discretion.
5.5 Welfare Effects of Discretionary Macropruden-
tial Policy
In this section, welfare effects of different macroprudential policies are compared when
they are conducted by discretion. Welfare effects of two macroprudential measures
(changes in LTV ratio and amortisation rate) and a mixture of two measure (changes
in LTV ratio and amortisation rate at the same time) are compared when these three
measures attain the same goal in two different cases. The first case is when discount
rate gap between borrower and saver is narrow as calibrated in the previous chapters.
In this case, the goal of policy measures is set to be the same amount of reduction in
household debt to output ratio (-9.7521%p).4 The second case is when discount rate
gap between borrower and saver is wide. The second case is set by lowering βb to 0.975
with the same value of βs . In this case, the goal of two measures is set to be the same
amount of increase in household debt to output ratio (10.87%p).5
5.5.1 Credit tightening when discount rate gap is narrow
When discount rate gap is narrow, three measures have very similar welfare effects as
we see in Table 5.1. Their effects on social welfare show little differences. Increasing
amortisation rate has marginally more negative effect on saver’s welfare and more
4This value comes from the amount of reduction in household debt to output ratio when LTV ratio
is lowered by 0.5 from 0.65 (initial steady-state) to 0.60 (new steady-state). The same amount of
reduction in household debt to output ratio is attained by increasing amortisation by 0.00067935 from
0.001 to 0.00167935. The policy mix is a change in LTV ratio from 0.65 to 0.6256027 and a change in
amortisation rate from 0.001 to 0.001343755.
5This value comes from the amount of increase in household debt to output ratio when LTV ratio
is increased by 0.5 from 0.60 (initial steady-state) to 0.65 (new steady-state) while amortisation rate
is set to be 0.002. The same amount of increase in household debt to output ratio is attained by
decreasing amortisation rate by 0.00091726 from 0.002 to 0.00108274. The policy mix is a change in
LTV ratio from 0.60 to 0.6257613 and a change in amortisation rate from 0.002 to 0.00154901
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positive effect on borrower and social welfare although the overall differences are very
small. In terms of gap between borrower’s welfare gain and saver’s welfare loss, lowering
LTV ratio makes the least gap between two types of households’ welfare. Decomposed
effects in Table 5.2 show increasing amortisation rate reduces borrower’s welfare less
in housing and increases it less in hours worked while welfare gains in consumption
have little differences among three measures. Therefore, if macroprudential policy
has more weight on borrower’s welfare gain or minimum social welfare loss, increasing
amortisation rate is the most effective among three. However, if macroprudential policy
has more weight on balanced welfare effects, lowering LTV ratio is the most effective.
Table 5.1: Comparing welfare effects of two macroprudential policies (Case 1)
Measure Welfare gains
Borrower Saver Social
Lowering LTV ratio 0.024 -0.0126 -0.0004
Increasing amortisation rate 0.027 -0.0135 -0.0003
Policy mix 0.026 -0.0130 -0.0003
Table 5.2: Decomposition of household’s welfare gains (Case 1)
Welfare gains
Consumption Housing Hours worked Total
<Lowering LTV ratio>
Borrower 0.0026 -0.0020 0.0018 0.0024
Saver -0.0071 -0.0015 -0.0041 -0.0126
<Increasing amo. rate>
Borrower 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0015 0.0027
Saver -0.0076 -0.0012 -0.0047 -0.0135
<Policy mix>
Borrower 0.0025 -0.0017 0.0017 0.0026
Saver -0.0073 -0.0014 -0.0044 -0.0130
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5.5.2 Credit loosening when discount rate gap is wide
When discount rate gap is wide, three measures have clearly different welfare effects as
we see in Table 5.3. When LTV ratio increases, social and borrower’s welfare gains are
the largest but saver’s welfare loss is the biggest. Decomposed effects in Table 5.4 show
increasing LTV ratio raises borrower’s welfare mainly in housing and reduces saver’s
welfare both in consumption and hours worked. When amortisation rate lowers, bor-
rower’s welfare show little change but saver’s welfare gain is the biggest. Decomposed
effects show decreasing amortisation raises saver’s welfare mainly in consumption and
hours worked. Borrower’s tiny welfare loss is the result of trade-off between welfare
loss in housing and welfare gains in consumption and hours worked. When two policies
are mixed, both type of households attain welfare gains only in housing. Therefore if
macroprudential policy has more weight on borrower’s and social welfare gains, increas-
ing LTV ratio is the most effective among three. However, if macroprudential policy
has more weight on balanced welfare effects, policy mix can be preferred. Although
lowering amortisation rate can get the lowest social welfare gains, we can see that it
is very close to the Pareto-improving policy because saver can get welfare gain while
borrower’s welfare loss is negligible.
Table 5.3: Comparing welfare effects of two macroprudential policies (Case 2)
Measure Welfare gains
Borrower Saver Social
Increasing LTV ratio 0.0083 -0.0208 0.0034
Lowering amortisation rate -0.0001 0.0126 0.0020
Policy mix 0.0042 -0.0033 0.0029
5.6 Optimal Macroprudential Policy Rule
In this section, it is shown that how optimal countercyclical macroprudential rule can
improve social welfare. It is assumed that government follows the following rules which
are based on the processes introduced in the previous chapter and similar to a Taylor-
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Table 5.4: Decomposition of household’s welfare gain (Case 2)
Welfare gains
Consumption Housing Hours worked Total
<Increasing LTV ratio>
Borrower 0.0003 0.0109 -0.0029 0.0083
Saver -0.0108 0.0010 -0.0110 -0.0208
<Lowering amo. rate>
Borrower 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0004 -0.0001
Saver 0.0069 0.0016 0.0041 0.0126
<Policy mix>
Borrower -0.0011 0.0076 -0.0022 0.0042
Saver -0.0016 0.0012 -0.0029 -0.0033
type monetary policy rule.
θt = θρθt−1
[
θ
(
xt
xt−1
)−χθ]1−ρθ
exp(−εθ,t) (5.6.1)
where xt = {db,t, D2Yt, qt}, D2Yt is household debt to output ratio at time t and χθ is
the parameter which measures the response to household debt related indicator xt.
%t = %ρ%t−1
[
%
(
xt
xt−1
)χ%]1−ρ%
exp(ε%,t) (5.6.2)
where xt = {db,t, D2Yt, qt}, and χ% is the parameter which measures the response to
household debt related indicator xt.
For this experiment, the steady-state value of amortisation is set at 0.005 instead
of 0.001. The calibrated value of 0.001 in chapter 4 is based on the fact that more than
90% of mortgage was interest-only type before 2010 in South Korea. However, interest-
only type mortgage is prohibited since 2016 so that current average amortisation rate
should be higher than 0.001. The rest of parameter values are the same as in chapter 4.
Figure 5.5 shows social welfare gains under the three alternative LTV ratio rules
for the value of χθ from zero to 50. Only the LTV ratio rule which responds to the house
price (qt) attains social welfare gains. Social welfare gains are maximised when χθ is
41. However, this rule cannot make Pareto-superior outcomes as shown in Table 5.5.
Figure 5.6 describes social welfare gains under the three alternative amortisation
rate rules for the value of χ% from zero to 50. All three amortisation rate rules attains
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Figure 5.5: Welfare gains with LTV ratio rule
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Notes: 1. χθ increases by 1 starting from zero. 2. Welfare gain (loss) = welfare with
the new χθ − welfare with the initial χθ(= 0). 3. Solid lines: xt = db,t, Dotted lines:
xt = D2Yt, Dashed lines: xt = qt
social welfare gains but the one which responds to household debt (db,t) can attain
the highest social welfare gain when χ% is 30. However, this rule cannot make Pareto-
superior outcomes as shown in Table 5.5. The other two rules also cannot attain Pareto
improvement.
When LTV ratio rule and amortisation rate rule are mixed, the maximum social
welfare gains are slightly higher than when there is only LTV ratio rule as shown in
Table 5.5. The optimal parameter values are χθ = 40 when LTV ratio rule is against
house price and χ% = 11 when amortisation rate rule is against household debt. There
is no Pareto improving rule.
Table 5.5: Welfare gains by optimal macroprudential rules
Rule Welfare gains
Borrower Saver Social
LTV ratio rule (xt = qt and χθ = 40)
+ amortisation rule (xt = db,t and χ% = 11) -0.00088 0.0074 0.000589
LTV ratio rule only (xt = qt and χθ = 41) -0.00094 0.0076 0.000586
Amortisation rate rule only (xt = db,t and χ% = 30) 0.00027 -0.0011 0.000028
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Figure 5.6: Welfare gains with amortisation rate rule
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Notes: 1. χ% increases by 1 starting from zero. 2. Welfare gain (loss) = welfare with
the new χ% − welfare with the initial χ%(= 0). 3. Solid lines: xt = db,t, Dotted lines:
xt = D2Yt, Dashed lines: xt = qt
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, welfare effects of macroprudential policy are examined on the basis of
the model built in the previous chapter. It is found that discretionary macroprudential
policies in South Korea cannot make social welfare gains because social welfare gains
are possible only when the initial LTV ratio is higher than 0.72. guerrieri2017collateral
χθ = 41 and χ% = 30.
These results imply that discretionary credit tightening policy cannot attain social
welfare gains in a situation given in South Korea. So what government can do with
discretionary credit tightening policy is to minimise social welfare losses and the best
measure for that is increasing amortisation rate. If government adopts countercyclical
macroprudential rule, it is possible to improve social welfare but it requires welfare loss
either of borrower or saver. When the best rule for maximum social welfare gains is
adopted, borrower’s welfare loss is inevitable.
Major limitation of this analysis is that welfare measure does not provide infor-
mation on the transition path. Welfare measure in this chapter can only provide infor-
mation on the change in welfare from the initial steady-state to the new steady-state.
More general welfare analysis which can include welfare changes over the trajectory is
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left for the further future research.
Appendix
5.A Dynare Code
var
LAMBDAB // Lagrangian multiplier on borrower budget constraint
LAMBDAS // Lagrangian multiplier on saver budget constraint
CB // Consumption of borrower
CS // Consumption of saver
C // Aggregate Consumption
THETA // LTV ratio
PHI // Housing preference
Q // House price
HB // Housing stock of borrower
HS // Housing stock of saver
WB // Wage of borrower
WS // Wage of saver
LB // Labour supply of borrower
LS // Labour supply of saver
L // Aggregate Labour supply
MUB // Lagrangian multiplier on borrower borrowing constraint
MUS // Lagrangian multiplier on saver capital accumulation
R // Nominal gross interest rate
AMO // Amortisation rate
DB // Debt of borrower
DS // Debt of saver
NB // Housing investment of borrower
NS // Housing investment of saver
N // Aggregate Housing investment
RK // Capital rental rate
K // Capital stock
IK // Capital investment
F // Investment adjustment cost
Y // Output
IH // Housing investment
PI // Inflation
VP // VP
PS // PI^*
MC // Marginal cost
M // M
Z // Z
TB // Tax for borrower
TS // Tax for saver
107
5.A. Dynare Code 108
G // Government spending
FC // Fixed Cost
AT // AR(1) technology process
IKS // AR(1) capital investment-specific technology process
IHS // AR(1) housing investment-specific technology process
UTB // Borrower Utility
UTS // Saver Utility
VB // Borrower Expected Utility
VS // Saver Expected Utility
;
varexo
EPS_AT // technology shock
EPS_AMO // amortisation rate shock
EPS_THETA // LTV ratio shock
EPS_PHI // housing preference shock
EPS_G // fiscal shock
EPS_MS // monetary policy shock
EPS_IK // capital investment-specific technology shock
EPS_IH // housing investment-specific technology shock
;
parameters
alppha // capital share
niu // wage share of borrower
bettab // discount factor of borrower
bettas // discount factor of saver
eta // inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
deltak // capital depreciation rate
deltah // housing depreciation rate
psi // population share of borrower
zetak // capital investment adjustment cost parameter
zetah // adjustment cost parameter in house production
epsil // epsilon
xip // xip
sharetb // tax share of borrower
shareg // government spending share in output
or // degree of smoothing in monetary policy
op // policy weight on inflation
oy // policy weight on output
rhoat // autocorrelation technology shock
rhoamo // autocorrelation amortisatino shock
rhotheta // autocorrelation LTV shock
rhophi // autocorrelation housing preference shock
rhog // autocorrelation fiscal shock
hf // habit formation
rhoik // autocorrelation fiscal shock
rhoih // autocorrelation fiscal shock
;
bettas=.998;
bettab=.995;
psi=.657;
deltak=.025;
deltah=.005;
epsil=7.67;
shareg=.142;
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sharetb=.55;
rhoat=.8093;
rhog=.5148;
rhoamo=.8000;
rhotheta=.7221;
rhophi=.8674;
rhoik=.7762;
rhoih=.8582;
zetak=3.0859;
zetah=6.4665;
hf=0.3543;
xip=.4465;
alppha=.3273;
niu=.7974;
or=.8817;
oy=.1034;
op=3.0049;
eta=1.3158;
model;
LAMBDAB=1/(CB-hf*CB(-1))-bettab*hf/(CB(+1)-hf*CB);
Q*(1-MUB*THETA)=bettab*(LAMBDAB(+1)/LAMBDAB)*(PHI(+1)/(LAMBDAB(+1)*HB)+(1-deltah)
*Q(+1)*(1-MUB(+1)*THETA(+1)));
WB=LB^eta/LAMBDAB;
LAMBDAB*(1-MUB)=bettab*LAMBDAB(+1)*(R-(1-AMO)*MUB(+1))/PI(+1);
CB+Q*NB+R(-1)*DB(-1)/PI=WB*LB+DB-TB;
DB=(1-AMO(-1))*DB(-1)/PI+THETA*Q*NB;
NB=HB-(1-deltah)*HB(-1);
LAMBDAS=1/(CS-hf*CS(-1))-bettas*hf/(CS(+1)-hf*CS);
Q=bettas*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*(PHI(+1)/(LAMBDAS(+1)*HS)+(1-deltah)*Q(+1));
WS=LS^eta/LAMBDAS;
LAMBDAS=bettas*LAMBDAS(+1)*R/PI(+1);
MUS=bettas*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*(RK(+1)+(1-deltak)*MUS(+1));
NS=HS-(1-deltah)*HS(-1);
K=(1-deltak)*K(-1)+F;
F=IKS*(1-zetak*(1/2)*(IK/IK(-1)-1)^2)*IK;
1=MUS*IKS*(1-zetak*(1/2)*(IK/IK(-1)-1)^2-zetak*(IK/IK(-1)-1)*(IK/IK(-1)))+bettas
*IKS(+1)*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*MUS(+1)*zetak*(IK(+1)/IK-1)*(IK(+1)/IK)^2;
VP=xip*(PI(-1)/PI)^(-epsil)*VP(-1)+(1-xip)*PS^(-epsil);
FC=steady_state(FC);
Y*VP+AT*FC=AT^(1-alppha)*K(-1)^alppha*((psi*LB)^niu*((1-psi)*LS)^(1-niu))^
(1-alppha);MC*niu*(1-alppha)*(VP*Y+AT*FC)*LB^(-1)=psi*WB;
MC*(1-niu)*(1-alppha)*(VP*Y+AT*FC)*LS^(-1)=(1-psi)*WS;
MC=(1/(1-alppha))^(1-alppha)*(1/alppha)^alppha*(1/AT)^(1-alppha)*RK^alppha*(((1/niu)
*WB)^niu*((1/(1-niu))*WS)^(1-niu))^(1-alppha);
PS*M=Z;
Z=(epsil/(epsil-1))*LAMBDAS*MC*Y+bettas*xip*(PI/PI(+1))^(1-epsil)*Z(+1);
M=LAMBDAS*Y+bettas*xip*(PI/PI(+1))^(-epsil)*M(+1);
1=xip*(PI(-1)/PI)^(1-epsil)+(1-xip)*PS^(1-epsil);
1=Q*IHS*(1-zetah*(1/2)*(IH/IH(-1)-1)^2-zetah*(IH/IH(-1)-1)*(IH/IH(-1)))+bettas
*IHS(+1)*(LAMBDAS(+1)/LAMBDAS)*Q(+1)*zetah*(IH(+1)/IH-1)*(IH(+1)/IH)^2;
N=IHS*(1-zetah*(1/2)*(IH/IH(-1)-1)^2)*IH;
psi*TB=sharetb*shareg*Y;
G=psi*TB+(1-psi)*TS;
R/steady_state(R)=(R(-1)/steady_state(R))^or*((PI/steady_state(PI))^op
*(Y/steady_state(Y))^oy)^(1-or)*exp(EPS_MS);
psi*DB+(1-psi)*DS=0;
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N=(1-psi)*NS+psi*NB;
C=(1-psi)*CS+psi*CB;
L=(1-psi)*LS+psi*LB;
Y=C+IH+IK+G;
ln(AT)=rhoat*ln(AT(-1))+EPS_AT;
ln(AMO)=rhoamo*ln(AMO(-1))+(1-rhoamo)*ln(steady_state(AMO))+EPS_AMO;
ln(THETA)=rhotheta*ln(THETA(-1))+(1-rhotheta)*ln(steady_state(THETA))-EPS_THETA;
ln(PHI)=rhophi*ln(PHI(-1))+(1-rhophi)*ln(steady_state(PHI))-EPS_PHI;
ln(G)=rhog*ln(G(-1))+(1-rhog)*ln(steady_state(G))+EPS_G;
ln(IKS)=rhoik*ln(IKS(-1))+EPS_IK;
ln(IHS)=rhoih*ln(IHS(-1))+EPS_IH;
UTB=log(CB-hf*CB(-1))+PHI*LOG(HB(-1))-LB^(1+eta)/(1+eta);
UTS=log(CS-hf*CS(-1))+PHI*LOG(HS(-1))-LS^(1+eta)/(1+eta);
VB=UTB+bettab*VB(+1);
VS=UTS+bettas*VS(+1);
end;
steady_state_model;
THETA=0.626;
PHI=.1468;
AMO=0.001;
PI=1.006;
AT=1;
IKS=1;
IHS=1;
Q=1;
MUS=1;
R=PI/bettas;
MUB=PI*(1-bettab/bettas)/(PI-bettab*(1-AMO));
RK=1/bettas-(1-deltak);
AUX1=(bettab*PHI)*(1-hf)/((1-MUB*THETA)*(1-(1-deltah)*bettab)*(1-bettab*hf));
AUX2=(bettas*PHI)/(1-(1-deltah)*bettas)/(1-bettas*hf)*(1-hf);
AUX3=((RK*(niu*(1-alppha)-sharetb*shareg))/(psi*alppha))/(1+AUX1*deltah*(1
+((THETA*Q)/(1-(1-AMO)/PI))*(R/PI-1)));
AUX4=(RK*(1-shareg)/alppha-deltak-psi*AUX3*(1+deltah*AUX1))/((1-psi)*(1+deltah
*AUX2));
LB=((niu*(1-alppha)*RK*(1-bettab*hf))/(alppha*psi*AUX3*(1-hf)))^(1/(eta+1));
LS=(((1-niu)*(1-alppha)*RK*(1-bettas*hf))/(alppha*(1-psi)*AUX4*(1-hf)))^(1/(eta+1));
PS=1;
MC=(epsil-1)/epsil;
K=(MC*alppha/RK)^(1/(1-alppha))*(psi*LB)^niu*((1-psi)*LS)^(1-niu);
Y=(RK*K)/alppha;
CB=AUX3*K;
CS=AUX4*K;
LAMBDAB=(1-bettab*hf)/(CB*(1-hf));
LAMBDAS=(1-bettas*hf)/(CS*(1-hf));
HB=AUX1*CB;
HS=AUX2*CS;
NB=deltah*HB;
NS=deltah*HS;
N=(1-psi)*NS+psi*NB;
IH=N;
DB=(THETA*Q*NB)/(1-(1-AMO)/PI);
DS=(psi/(psi-1))*DB;
C=(1-psi)*CS+psi*CB;
L=(1-psi)*LS+psi*LB;
F=deltak*K;
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IK=F;
VP=1;
FC=Y/(epsil-1);
WB=(niu*(1-alppha)*Y)/(psi*LB);
WS=((1-niu)*(1-alppha)*Y)/((1-psi)*LS);
M=LAMBDAS*Y/(1-bettas*xip);
Z=LAMBDAS*Y/(1-bettas*xip);
TB=sharetb*shareg*Y/psi;
G=shareg*Y;
TS=(G-psi*TB)/(1-psi);
UTB=log(CB*(1-hf))+PHI*log(HB)-LB^(1+eta)/(1+eta);
UTS=log(CS*(1-hf))+PHI*log(HS)-LS^(1+eta)/(1+eta);
VB=UTB/(1-bettab);
VS=UTS/(1-bettas);
end;
resid(1);
steady;
check;
options_.pruning=1;
stoch_simul(periods=1000,hp_filter=1600, order = 2, noprint,irf=0) VB VS;
Chapter 6
Conclusions
South Korean government are trying to curb rapidly rising household debt mainly by
using demand-side credit tightening policy. This study tries to provide appropriate
models to analyse effects of demand-side credit tightening policy. These models also
suggest how monetary policy affects not only households and the economy but also
household debt, and how macroprudential (credit tightening) policy and monetary
policy are different from each other as a measure controlling the level of household
debt. Furthermore, effects of macroprudential policy are analysed in terms of social
welfare as well as households’ welfare.
To make the level of household debt policy target, the level of household debt
needs to be defined in a model as realistic as possible. The third chapter shows how the
collateral constraint, which clearly distinguishes household debt (stock) from borrowing
(flow), works well or better than the collateral constraint mostly used in the previous
literature in a simple DSGE model. Although, in chapter 3, the model is relatively
simple and only calibration is used to set parameter values, the model succeeds in
matching the actual data from South Korea and proves that it can be a better model
to evaluate effects of macroprudential policy in South Korea. The collateral constraint
contributes to the better results especially when we analyse the phase of tightening
household credit conditions by using macroprudential policy. Furthermore, it enables
us to see how amortization rate affects the Korean economy. Results from this model
suggest that increasing amortisation rate is a superior measure to decreasing LTV
ratio because it induces less volatility in the economy. In addition, they imply that
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the source of house price decline needs to be checked before estimating its effects on
households and entire economy because its effects are smaller when the house price
declines independently.
Based on the successful results from the third chapter, the fourth chapter at-
tempts to extend the model to see how macroprudential (credit tightening) policy and
monetary policy work differently and they interact. Habit formation in non-durable
good consumption, price rigidity in non-durable good producers, fixed cost in inter-
mediate good production and monetary policy are added in the model. Not only the
newly added elements themselves but also inflation make model’s responses different
from those in previous chapter. Nominal and real rigidities make dynamics last longer
and more realistic. In this model, inflation can reduce the level of real household debt
whereas there is no inflation effect on real household debt with the common type of col-
lateral constraint in the previous literature. This also influences responses to monetary
policy shock. The results have three implications. When it comes to slowing down the
speed of household debt, monetary policy is not effective and may even bring opposite
effects. Only credit tightening is effective. Among all policy measures considered, de-
creasing amortization rate is the most effective and increasing LTV ratio is the second.
These implies that ongoing policy efforts to slow down the growth rate of household
debt in South Korea is on the right track. Next, the magnitude and transmission of
monetary policy are not significantly affected by macroprudential regime or the level
of household debt. Last, the effect of house price drop may be relatively limited if the
source of change in house price is independent from other macroeconomic variables.
The fifth chapter analyses welfare effects of macroprudential policy in South Ko-
rea. The results suggest that discretionary credit tightening cannot increase social
welfare in a situation given in South Korea. Thus, its goal could be to minimise so-
cial welfare losses, if possible, by increasing amortisation rate. When discount rate
gap between patient and impatient households is narrow as calibrated in chapter 4,
increasing amortisation rate as a measure of discretionary credit tightening is the most
effective in terms of minimum social welfare losses or maximum borrower’s welfare gain.
When discount rate gap is wide, increasing LTV ratio as a measure of discretionary
credit loosening is the most effective in terms of maximum social welfare gains. Next,
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adopting countercyclical macroprudential rule can improve social welfare but patient
or impatient household cannot help but to lose its welfare. It is shown that the rule
which mixes LTV ratio rule against house price and amortisation rate rule against
household debt is the best among all rules.
There are limitations of this thesis. First, the models in this study assume the
closed economy to simplify the analysis. To get more realistic results, the models can be
extended to the open economy if we consider that South Korean economy is closer to the
open economy. Second, welfare analysis does not provide information on the transition
path. Welfare analysis in this study can only provide information on the change in
welfare from the initial steady-state to the new steady-state. Third, it would be more
rich analysis if effects of DTI (deb to income) regulation are included. In South Korea,
DTI regulation is also one of major demand-side credit tightening measures. Fourth,
it should be noted that the models used in this thesis are not the only ones for the
analysis of housing market and business cycle. There could be many different point of
views on this topic. In modelling household’s time preference, a different approach such
as present-bias1 could be incorporated. Although houses are assumed to be only owned
by households in this thesis, rented houses could be also considered as Shiller (2007)
points out. House prices can be viewed from spatial aspects.2 Although, in this thesis,
impatient households are borrowers and patient households are savers, borrowers and
savers could be younger generation and older generation as in Blanchard (1985).
1See Laibson (2015) for the details of present biased discounting.
2See Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani (2017) for the details of spatial aspects.
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